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STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND SINGLE PEAKEDNESS IN BOUNDED
DISTRIBUTIVE LATTICES
ERNESTO SAVAGLIO♮ AND STEFANO VANNUCCI‡,
Abstract. Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant lit-
erature are singled out and discussed. Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications,
a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive lattice is strategy-proof on the set of all pro-
files of single peaked total preorders if and only if it can be represented as an iterated median of
projections and constants, or equivalently as the behaviour of a certain median tree-automaton.
The equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness that is known to hold for single
peaked domains in bounded linear orders fails in such a general setting. A related impossibility
result on anonymous coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules is also obtained.
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1. Introduction
A good decision on an issue of social concern such as location of a public facility or choice of a
tax rate has to rely on some information that is typically private and disperse among the relevant
stakeholders. In many cases, voting by a suitable committee is one of the most practical means to
elicit and amalgamate such information, and produce the final decision. Since part of the relevant
information is private, however, voters may attempt to manipulate the outcome by misrepresenting
that information (say, their most preferred outcome), and they are likely to do that if the voting
rule allows for profitable individual manipulations. Now, that manipulative behaviour may easily
result in inefficient outcomes, especially if enacted by several uncoordinated voters. Furthermore,
the perceived availability of profitable manipulations may encourage diversion of voters’ resources
to gather private information concerning other voters. Thus, in order to prevent such possibly
wasteful manipulative activities a voting rule should be reputedly strategy-proof, namely immune to
advantageous individual manipulations. If, moreover, voters have access to cheap communication
facilities allowing them to coordinate their voting strategies, then they can engage in coalitional
manipulations as well. Therefore, in that case a voting rule should also be reputedly coalitionally
strategy-proof, namely immune to jointly profitable manipulations on the part of coalitions of voters.
Those observations raise the following general identification issues:
(i) what are (if any) the strategy-proof voting rules on the relevant preference domain?
(ii) which of them (if any) are also coalitionally strategy-proof?
Of course, several alternative domains may be - and have been - taken into consideration in the
aftermath of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem. The present paper will address the
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foregoing issues mainly focussing on an important class of single peaked1 domains of total preorders
in bounded distributive lattices2, namely the domains denoted here as unimodal and locally strictly
unimodal (to be defined below). A characterization of the entire class of strategy-proof voting rules
on the full unimodal and locally strictly unimodal domains will be provided, generalizing or extending
virtually all previously known results of that kind. Quite remarkably, the simple majority rule or
extended median (that is well-known to be strategy-proof and coalitionally strategy-proof on both
unimodal and locally strictly unimodal domains in bounded chains) is confirmed to belong to the
strategy-proof class even in the present wider setting. On the other hand, it will also be shown that
in a very large class of bounded distributive lattices that are not linear orders, and under minimal
neutrality3 requirements, no anonymous voting rule is coalitionally strategy-proof on the foregoing
domains.
Single peaked preferences arise in a natural way whenever each agent’s representation of the
outcome space is endowed with some ‘natural’ ternary betweenness relation establishing for any two
outcomes x, y whether an arbitrary outcome z lies between x and y or not: indeed, single peaked
total preorders are those total preorders with a unique best outcome that respect -are consistent
with- such betweenness relation.
However, such a broad description of single peakedness is in fact compatible with several distinct
specifications of the domain of single peaked preference relations.
At least two salient issues require further preliminary clarification, namely:
(a) is the relevant betweenness relation agent-invariant (hence unique) or agent-dependent, and
(b) what is precisely meant by ‘consistency of preferences with the relevant betweenness rela-
tions’?
Concerning the first issue, the present paper follows the tradition that can be traced back at least
to Black (1948) and was largely taken for granted in the early social choice theoretic literature: the
relevant betweenness relation is required to be agent-invariant hence unique across voters, modeling
a representation of the outcome structure that is entirely shared by all the involved parties.
Concerning the second issue, we focus on the two main variants encountered in the literature on
single peakedness, namely
(1) the ‘compromise’-view of betweenness-consistency for preferences: if an outcome is intermedi-
ate between two outcomes x and y then it is to be regarded as a ‘compromise’ between those two locally
‘extreme’ outcomes and as such is not strictly worse than both x and y. Such a ‘compromise’-view
can also be given a ‘proximity’-interpretation, relying on a suitable metric induced by the under-
lying lattice. That notion of betweenness-consistency is in fact, arguably, the most ‘natural’ and
appropriate one whenever the outcome set is a distributive lattice;
(2) an alternative ‘top proximity’-view of betweenness-consistency for preferences: if an outcome
is intermediate between the top outcome and another outcome y and distinct from the latter, it is
also closer than y to the top outcome and therefore strictly better than y. It turns out, however,
1‘Single peakedness’ will be used as a general non-technical term that admits of several specifications, including
of course unimodality and locally strict unimodality as introduced below.
2A distributive lattice is a partially ordered set such that any two elements x,y admit a least upper bound or
join x ∨ y and a greatest lower bound or meet x ∧ y that mutually ‘distribute’ on each other i.e. interact much like
set-theoretic union and intersection. Clearly, the join and meet of any finite set of elements are also well-defined.
3A voting rule is neutral with respect to a certain pair of outcomes when it treats them in an unbiased manner.
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that such a notion of ‘top proximity’ -when employed in a distributive lattice that is not a chain,
and defined through a suitable latticial metric (as discussed below under Remark 1)- generates a
somewhat spurious notion of local single-peakedness allowing for the existence of many local peaks
(more on this point below).
For the sake of convenience we shall denote as unimodal (locally strictly unimodal, respectively)
precisely those preference profiles of total preorders that are single peaked under specification (1)
((2), respectively) of betweenness-consistency. Indeed, most contributions in the literature on sin-
gle peakedness and strategy-proofness of voting rules and social choice functions focus exactly on
unimodal or locally strictly unimodal preference profiles as defined above.
In a pioneering paper, Moulin (1980) characterizes the class of all strategy-proof voting rules
(or, equivalently, ‘top-only’ social choice functions) on the domain of all total preorders that are
unimodal with respect to the ‘natural’ betweenness relation of a bounded linearly ordered outcome
set. In fact, he shows that such strategy-proof voting rules are precisely those based on the median
as applied to voters’ choices possibly augmented with a certain set of fixed outcomes aptly dubbed
‘phantom vote(r)s’ by Border and Jordan (1983). Moreover, in the foregoing work Moulin points
out that those voting rules are also coalitionally strategy-proof.
In a remarkable subsequent contribution, Danilov (1994) provides a similar median-based char-
acterization of strategy-proof voting rules on the domain of all linear preference orders that are
unimodal with respect to the ‘natural’ betweenness relation of a (bounded) undirected tree, and
establishes equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness on that domain.
Now, (bounded) linear orders or chains are a quite special subclass of (bounded) distributive
lattices, and many outcome spaces which are of interest for multi-agent aggregation problems and
are not chains do share with chains precisely that latticial structure. Several examples of such
outcome spaces will be presented and discussed in some detail in Section 3 below. They include
spaces consisting respectively of choice functions or generalized revealed preference relations, graded
evaluations of items, systems of poverty thresholds, judgments consisting of deductively closed sets
of statements, binary (dis)similarity relations or matrices, portfolios of basic derivative assets.
Moreover, a very natural betweenness relation is available in any lattice: just declare z to lie
between x and y if z is larger than -or equal to- the meet of x and y (written x ∧ y) and smaller
than -or equal to- the join of x and y (written x ∨ y).4 Hence, both unimodal and locally strictly
unimodal preference domains of total preorders can be easily defined for all (bounded) distributive
lattices with respect to the standard latticial betweenness, namely: a total preference preorder on
a distributive lattice is unimodal if it has a unique maximum and is ‘compromise’-consistent (‘top
proximity-consistent’, respectively) with the latticial betweenness relation.
No characterizations of strategy-proof voting rules on unimodal domains in general (possibly
infinite) bounded distributive lattices other than chains are available in the extant literature. In
particular, the equivalence issue concerning strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-proofness of
voting rules on unimodal domains has never been addressed before in the foregoing latticial setting.
4That is, for instance, the notion of betweenness underlying ‘intermediate preferences’ as introduced by Grandmont
(1978) and recently reconsidered by Bossert and Sprumont (2014) in their study of strategy-proof preference aggre-
gation rules. That is also the betweenness relation underlying the proximity-based interpretation of single peakedness
used by Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993) who rely on the L1-metric (or ‘taxi-cab’ metric).
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To be sure, there are some partial results implying existence of strategy-proof voting rules but
not of coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules on locally strictly unimodal domains in some special
distributive lattices. But those results do not address at all the case of unimodal domains in bounded
distributive lattices since they variously concern top-proximity-based single peaked preferences with
respect to Euclidean-metric-betweenness in m-dimensional Euclidean spaces 5 with m ≥ 2 (see e.g.
Border and Jordan (1983), Bordes, Laffond and Le Breton (2012)), or preference domains such
as locally strictly unimodal domains in finite products of bounded chains or in finite distributive
lattices (Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993) and (Nehring and Puppe (2007 a, b), respectively) or
separable preferences (Barbera´, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991)) in certain finite Boolean lattices of
cardinality eight or more6 . The latter preference domains, however, turn out to be disjoint from
unimodal domains on that class of lattices. Moreover, the foregoing works do not address at all the
general case of bounded distributive lattices.
But then, what about strategy-proof voting rules on unimodal (or locally strictly unimodal) do-
mains in arbitrary bounded distributive lattices? Are they median-representable? When do they
also enjoy equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness?
The present paper aims at filling this significant gap in the literature and provides a study
of strategy-proofness and unimodality in general bounded distributive lattices. A median-based
characterization of strategy-proof voting rules on unimodal and locally strictly unimodal domains
in bounded distributive lattices is established by introducing median tree-automata representations
of voting rules. It is a remarkable feature of our characterization that it unifies (generalizing or
extending, and bringing together) several notions, approaches and results from the extant literature,
namely:
• The characterization contributed by the present paper generalizes Moulin’s original char-
acterization of strategy-proof voting rules on unimodal domains in bounded chains to both
(full) unimodal and locally strictly unimodal domains in all bounded distributive lattices,
obtaining a lattice-polynomial representation which is a dual -and equivalent- version of
that produced by the former author for the special case of bounded linear orders or chains
(Moulin (1980)).
• Our characterization also highlights the equivalence of that lattice-polynomial representation
to another and new representation of strategy-proof voting rules on unimodal domains as
the behaviour maps of certain median tree-automata acting on suitably labelled trees. That
tree-automata-theoretic representation essentially amounts to a streamlining and extension
of the approach pioneered by Danilov (1994) in his remarkable characterization of strategy-
proof voting rules on unimodal domains of linear orders in bounded trees via an interval-
monotonicity property.
• The lattice-polynomial representation mentioned above is in turn a generalization of ‘latticial-
federation consensus functions’ or, equivalently, of ‘generalized committee voting rules’ as
introduced respectively, and independently, by Monjardet (1990) in his path-breaking con-
tribution to (non-strategic) aggregation problems in latticial structures, and by Barbera´,
5Recall that Euclidean spaces may be regarded as Riesz spaces i.e. as partially ordered vector spaces that are also
(distributive) lattices.
6A Boolean lattice is a bounded distributive lattice with upper bound 1 and lower bound 0 such that each element
x has a complement x′ satisfying both x ∨ x′ = 1 and x ∧ x′ = 0.
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Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) in their well-known study of strategy-proof voting mecha-
nisms on separable preference domains in finite Boolean lattices.
• Finally, it is also proved that the equivalence between strategy-proofness and coalitional
strategy-proofness - that is known to hold for both unimodal and locally strictly unimodal
domains in bounded linear orders and for unimodal domains of linear orders in bounded
trees- fails for both unimodal and locally strictly unimodal domains in bounded distributive
lattices that are not linear orders,7 hence even in outcome spaces with a well-defined (and
unique) median operation (Theorem 2). An impossibility theorem concerning coalitional
strategy-proofness on the full unimodal and locally strictly unimodal domains for anonymous
voting rules satisfying very weak local sovereignty and neutrality requirements (Theorem
3) is also provided. Thus, in particular, Theorem 3 establishes that the former equivalence
may fail in bounded distributive lattices even for non-sovereign voting rules8.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes several remarkable
examples of bounded distributive lattices that occur in some well-known aggregation problems.
Section 3 introduces the notation and definitions and includes the main results of the paper on the
structure of the strategy-proof voting rules for full unimodal and locally strictly unimodal domains
of total preorders in arbitrary bounded distributive lattices. In Section 4 the main results of the
present work are discussed in some detail with reference to a simple example concerning the Boolean
square. Section 5 includes a detailed discussion of some related literature and offers some concluding
remarks. Appendix 1 collects all the proofs. Appendix 2 is devoted to a detailed presentation of
the basic notions on tree automata used in the paper.
2. What kind(s) of single peakedness and why bounded distributive lattices?
Thus, our analysis shall be focussed on strategy-proof voting rules for both unimodal and locally
strictly unimodal preference profiles in bounded distributive lattices as informally defined in the
Introduction. Therefore, the model to be introduced below applies under the following conditions:
(1) the outcome set is a partially ordered set X = (X,6) with a top and a bottom, and such
that the (binary) least-upper bound ∨ and greatest-lower bound ∧ as induced by 6 satisfy the
distributive identity x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) for any x, y, z ∈ X ;
(2) all voters are prepared to assess outcomes according to the latticial ternary betweenness
relation of X denoted BX : namely, outcome z lies between outcomes x and y if and only if
x ∧ y 6 z 6 x ∨ y ;
(3) the preferences of all voters are consistent with the latticial betweenness relation in one of
the two following senses: (i) (unimodality) any outcome that z lies between outcomes x and y is
to be regarded as a ‘compromise’ between its relative extrema x and y and is therefore not strictly
7Vannucci (2012) provides a general incidence-geometric argument to explain that equivalence-failure.
8Indeed, Nehring and Puppe (2007 (b)) prove that the only efficient and strategy-proof voting rules on certain ‘rich’
subdomains of locally strictly unimodal domains of linear orders in finite Boolean lattices or m-hypercubes 2m with
m ≥ 3 are (weakly) dictatorial. Notice, however, that such preference domain is incomparable to our unimodal
domain and (weakly) efficient voting and social choice rules are in particular sovereign: thus, Nehring and Puppe’s
result pertains to a class of rules which is utterly non-comparable to the class of voting rules covered by Theorem 3
of the present work.
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worse than each one of the latter; (ii) (locally strict unimodality) any outcome that z lies between
top outcome x and outcome y and is distinct from y is to be regarded as ‘closer’ to the top outcome
than y and is therefore strictly better than y.
Observe that when specialized to the particular case of a bounded chain, conditions (1)-(2)-(3(i))
(or (1)-(2)-(3(ii))) are a list of plausible requirements to be met in order to justify single peaked
domains in the standard version pioneered by Black (1948). Indeed, the foregoing conditions -
especially (1)-(2)-(3(i))- arguably provide the ‘right’ extension of the notion of a single peaked
preference profile for distributive lattices as illustrated in the simple example concerning Boolean
squares as discussed above. Of course, even if condition (1) obtains, conditions (2) and/or (3) may
or may not hold depending on the problem under scrutiny. But it is at least conceivable that there
are interesting cases where conditions (1)-(2) and either (3(i)) or (3(ii)) are jointly satisfied, and
when that is the case, focusing on the full unimodal (or locally strictly unimodal) preference domain
of a bounded distributive lattice as defined in the present work seems to be fully justified, indeed
somewhat compelling.
In order to fully appreciate the remarkably wide scope and relevance of the proposed setting
let us consider just a few prominent classes of examples of bounded distributive lattices of special
interest, namely:
Example 1: Committee decision on multidimensional binary issues: aggregation of
points on a finite Boolean hypercube.
Let 2k be the set of points of a finite k-dimensional Boolean hypercube and ≤ the standard
componentwise order. Then, take the X =
(
2k,≤
)
. When considering an abstract location problem
on that discrete cube such as committee-selection of the appropriate profile of binary criteria to
be satisfied by candidates in order to qualify for a certain position: here, one has to face the issue
of aggregating the alternative proposals (namely points of 2k) advanced by members of a panel
committee.
Example 2: Committee selection of location on a multidimensional box: aggregation
of points in a product of bounded subsets of the extended real line.
Let R∗ = R∪{−∞,+∞} denote the extended real line, ≤
∗the component-wise extended natural
order on Rm∗ , Yi ⊆ R∗ for each i = 1, ...,m, and x, y ∈
m∏
i=1
Yi with x ≤
∗ y. Then, take X =(X,6)
with X =
{
z ∈
m∏
i=1
Yi : x ≤
∗ z ≤∗ y
}
and 6=≤∗|X(recall that a product of distributive lattices is
a distributive lattice under the component-wise order). This is the setting of Barbera`, Gul and
Stacchetti (1993) study of strategy-proofness on locally strictly unimodal domains. If m = 1,
(X 6) reduces to a bounded chain, which gives the original standard setting of the literature on
strategy-proofness on single peaked domains, including the seminal work of Moulin (1980) on the
characterization of strategy-proof voting rules on unimodal domains in a bounded real chain, where
X =(R∗,≤
∗).
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Example 3: Election of a representative body and committee selection of the target
of an ‘atomic’ package bid in a combinatorial auction: aggregation of subsets of a fixed
set.
Let Y be a set of items, P(Y ) its power set and Σ ⊆ P(Y ) a field of sets (namely Σ is nonempty
and such that {A ∩B,A ∪B,X rA} ⊆ Σ for any A,B ∈ Σ). Then, take X =(Σ,⊆). This kind of
domain arises in a most natural way in a few cases including combinatorial social choice problems,
i.e. social choice issues concerning mutually compatible objects (e.g. selection by committee decision
of a representative body, or of the target of an admissible package bid in a combinatorial auction
namely the item-subset to bid for: in the latter case, Σ denotes the set of admissible packages as
fixed by the auction mechanism designer with a view to keep communication complexity under some
acceptable threshold).
Example 4: Committee selection of a portfolio of basic derivative assets: aggregation
of points in a bounded Riesz space.
Let s : [0, 1]→ R+ be a continuous non-negative real-valued function denoting a limited-liability
state-dependent stock with state-space [0, 1], and b : [0, 1] → R+ a constant function denoting the
relevant bond; if s([0, 1]) = [α, β] then ordered linear space (X = C[α, β],6), the set of continuous
real-valued functions on [α, β] endowed with the component-wise natural order, denotes the space
of all continuous options on s. It turns out that (C[α, β],6) is in fact a Riesz space namely it is
also a (distributive) lattice: moreover, it is bounded with constant functions fα and fβ as bottom
and top elements, respectively. In particular, the latticial operations ∨ and ∧ of (C[α, β],6) enable
convenient representations of both call options on s and put options on s at any striking price p as
(s− pb)∨ 0 and (pb− s)∨ 0, respectively, and it can be shown that each continuous option in C[α, β]
can be represented as a portfolio of call options (see e.g. Brown and Ross (1991)). Thus, under the
foregoing stipulations a committee selection of a continuous option on a stock (or equivalently of a
portfolio of call options on that stock) amounts to an aggregation of points in bounded Riesz space
X =(C[α, β],6).
Example 5: General revealed preference aggregation: aggregation of choice functions
on a fixed set.
Let Y be a set of items, and P(Y ) its power set. A (full-domain) choice function on Y is a
function f : P(Y ) → P(Y ) such that f(A) ⊆ A for each A ⊆ Y . Now, denote by CY the set of all
choice functions on Y , and for any f, g ∈ CY posit f 6
′ g if and only if f(A) ⊆ g(A) for all A ⊆ Y .
Then, take X =(CY ,6
′), where the constant empty-valued choice function is the bottom and the
identity choice function is the top. The aggregation of the choice functions in CY may be regarded
as a natural generalization of the classic problem of preference aggregation in social welfare analysis
if preferences are taken to summarize choice behaviour and the usual ‘consistency’ requirements
related to acyclicity properties are relaxed. Indeed, the issue here is the elicitation and aggregation
of complete lists of recommendations concerning local choice behaviour from a population of experts
and/or stakeholders.
Example 6: Merging databases of binary (dis)similarity coefficients: aggregation of
dissimilarity and tolerance relations on a fixed set.
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Let Y a set of items: a dissimilarity (or orthogonality) relation on Y is an irreflexive and sym-
metric binary relation D on Y i.e. D ⊆ Y × Y is such that (i) (y, y) /∈ D for all y ∈ Y and (ii)
(y, z) ∈ D implies (z, y) ∈ D for all y, z ∈ Y . Denote by DY the set of all dissimilarity relations
on Y , and take X =(DY ,⊆); a tolerance (or similarity) relation on Y is a reflexive and symmetric
binary relation D on Y i.e. D ⊆ Y × Y is such that (i) (y, y) ∈ D for all y ∈ Y and (ii) (y, z) ∈ D
implies (z, y) ∈ D for all y, z ∈ Y . Denote by TY the set of all tolerance relations on Y , and take
X =(TY ,⊆). Dissimilarity and tolerance relations are one of the basic inputs in most algorithmic
classification procedures: if many (binary) dissimilarity databases from several distinct sources are
available, one may wish to aggregate them to produce a unique consensus database.
Example 7: Merging judgments with their implications: aggregation of order filters
over a partially ordered set.
Let Y =(Y,6) denote a finite partially ordered population. An order filter of Y is a set F ⊆ Y
such that for all y, z ∈ Y , z ∈ F whenever y ∈ F and y 6 z. Denote by FY the set of all order
filters of Y, and take X =(FY ,⊆). Order filters may variously arise in several aggregation problems,
including judgment aggregation problems with implication-constrained agendas. Thus, in the latter
case Y denotes a collection of propositions (namely, sets of logically equivalent sentences) and 6
denotes the relevant implication or consequence relation between propositions. In that connection,
a judgment amounts to a deductively closed set of propositions, namely an order filter of Y, and
establishing a consensus judgment reduces to aggregating order filters of Y.
Example 8: Merging proposals for multidimensional poverty thresholds: aggregation
of order ideals over a partially ordered set.
An order ideal of a partially ordered set Y = (Y,6) is a set I ⊆ Y such that for all y, z ∈ Y ,
z ∈ I whenever y ∈ I and z 6 y. Denote by IY the set of all order ideals of Y, and take X =(IY ,⊆).
Order ideals are also relevant to several aggregation problems, including choice of a (system of)
threshold(s) in multidimensional poverty analysis : a list of relevant binary attributes is considered,
and different thresholds namely combinations of minimal deprivations are proposed by qualified
experts and/or political representatives to identify the poor. Each threshold corresponds to an
order ideal, hence amalgamating the advanced proposals amounts to aggregating order ideals.
Example 9: Merging graded assessments, and computing reputations: aggregation
of graded evaluations.
Let Λ=(L,≤) denote a (bounded) linearly ordered set of grades, X a (finite) population of
candidates to be evaluated, and N a (finite) population of evaluators. Then, denote by LX the set
of all possible gradings of X , by 6 the point-wise partial order induced by ≤, and take X =(LX ,6).
This is indeed the formal setting recently proposed by Balinski and Laraki (2010) in order to
advance their case for majority judgment. It may be considered for aggregating grades achieved by
a population of students in different subjects, assessments of wines according to several alternative
graded criteria or the graded performances of participants in a multi-trial competition. A particular
case of special interest is provided by the definition of reputation systems, both off-line and on-line.
Indeed, by taking L ⊆ Z (or L ⊆ Q) with the natural order of the integers (or the rationals), and
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N = X , a point of LN denotes the approval/citation profile of an author (or the on-line feedback
profile of a web-node), and a reputation system is an aggregation function f : (LN)N → LN .
The foregoing set of examples is of course not meant to be an exhaustive list, and some of them
may well refer to comparatively more uncommon or hypothetical decision problems than others.
However, that list provides in our view a quite representative sample of the wide class of interesting
aggregation problems to which our results on strategy-proof voting rules in bounded distributive
lattices do in fact apply.
3. Model and results
Let N = {1, ..., n} denote the finite population of voters, and X =(X,6) the partially ordered
set of alternative outcomes (i.e. 6 is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation on
X). We suppose |N | ≥ 3 in order to avoid tedious qualifications, and denote as x||y any pair of 6-
incomparable outcomes.9 Let us also assume that X = (X,6) is a distributive lattice namely both
the least-upper-bound (l.u.b.) ∧ and the greatest-lower-bound (g.l.b.) ∨ of any x, y ∈ X as induced
by 6 are well-defined binay operations on X , and for all x, y, z ∈ X , x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z)
(or, equivalently, x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ z)).10 In particular, X = (X,6) is a linear order or
chain if [x 6 y or y 6 x] holds for all x, y ∈ X (recall that, as it is easily checked, a chain does
indeed satisfy the distributive identity above). A join irreducible element of X is any j ∈ X such
that j 6= ∧X and for any Y ⊆ X if j = ∨Y then j ∈ Y . The set of all join irreducible elements of X
is denoted JX . An atom of a lower bounded X is any 6-minimal x ∈ Xr {⊥}. The set of all atoms
of X is denoted AX : clearly, AX ⊆ JX . Moreover, a (distributive) lattice X is said to be lower
(upper) bounded if there exists ⊥ ∈ X (⊤ ∈ X) such that ⊥ 6 x (x 6 ⊤) for all x ∈ X , and
bounded if it is both lower bounded and upper bounded. A bounded distributive lattice (X,6)
is Boolean if for each x ∈ X there exists a complement namely an x′ ∈ X such that x ∨ x′ = ⊤
and x ∧ x′ = ⊥. A ternary betweenness relation BX =
{
(x, z, y) ∈ X3 : x ∧ y 6 z 6 x ∨ y
}
is
defined on X , and x, y ∈ X , [x, y] = {z ∈ X : x ∧ y 6 z 6 x ∨ y} is the interval induced by x and
y : therefore, for any x, y, z ∈ X, z ∈ [x, y] if and only if (x, z, y) ∈ BX (also written BX (x, z, y)).
11
It is a remarkable fact that a ternary operation called median is well-defined on an arbitrary
distributive lattice.
Definition 1. The median on X is the ternary operation µ : X3 → X defined as follows: for all
x, y, z ∈ X,
µ(x, y, z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (y ∧ z) ∨ (x ∧ z).
Notice that, due to commutativity and associativity of ∧ and ∨ the median µ as defined above
is invariant under permutations of its arguments or symmetric, namely for any x1, x2, x3 ∈ X and
any permutation σ : {1, 2, 3} −→ {1, 2, 3}, µ(xσ(1), xσ(2), xσ(3)) = µ(x1, x2, x3).
12
9We denote by |·| the cardinality of a set.
10Notice that thanks to associativity of ∨ and ∧ the l.u.b. and the g.l.b. of any finite Y ⊆ X are also well-defined
and denoted by ∨Y and ∧Y , respectively; if Y is infinite ∨Y and ∧Y may or may not be well-defined.
11The ensuing analysis could be pursued by replacing entirely betweenness relations with intervals (see Vannucci
(2012) for such an approach in a more general setting).
12It should be recalled here that Birkhoff and Kiss (1947) also provide a general characterization of the median
in a (bounded) distributive lattice through the following axioms for an arbitrary ternary operation m on a set A :
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Remark 1.Notice that a natural median-based betweenness relation BµX ⊆ X
3 can be defined
on X by the following rule: for any x, y, z ∈ X , (x, z, y) ∈ BµX iff µ(x, y, z) = z. But it is easily
shown that in fact BµX = BX (see Birkhoff and Kiss (1947), Theorem 1). Moreover, if the relevant
distributive lattice (X,6) is metric i.e. is endowed with a positive valuation namely a function
v : X → R such that v(x ∨ y) = v(x) + v(y) − v(x ∧ y) and v(x) < v(y) whenever x < y, then
it can be shown that BX =
{
(x, y, z) ∈ X3 : dv(x, z) = dv(x, y) + dv(y, z)
}
, where dv is the metric
induced by v as defined by the rule dv(x, y) = v(x ∨ y) − v(x ∧ y) (see Glivenko (1936), Theorem
V). Thus BX (x, y, z) holds precisely when y lies on a dv-geodesics or dv-shortest path joining x and
z. That fact suggests the possibility to provide BX with a straightforward metric representation
whenever deemed appropriate, and highlights the focal role of BX and of the median operation for
any plausible proximity relation respecting the latticial structure of X .
A few remarkable basic properties of BX are listed below:
Claim 1. The latticial betweenness relation BX satisfies the following conditions:
(i) symmetry: for all x, y, z ∈ X , if BX (x, z, y) then BX (y, z, x);
(ii) closure (or reflexivity): for all x, y ∈ X, BX (x, x, y) and BX (x, y, y);
(iii) idempotence: for all x, y ∈ X , BX (x, y, x) only if y = x;
(iv) convexity (or transitivity): for all x, y, z, u, v ∈ X , if BX (x, u, y), BX (x, v, y) and BX (u, z, v)
then BX (x, z, y);
(v) antisymmetry: for all x, y, z ∈ X , if BX (x, y, z) and BX (y, x, z) then x = y.
Now, consider the set TX of all topped total preorders on X (i.e. connected, reflexive, and
transitive binary relations having a unique maximum in X). For any <∈ TX , top(<) denotes the
unique maximum of < (while ≻ and ∼ denote the asymmetric and symmetric components of <,
respectively).
Definition 2. A topped total preorder <∈ TX is unimodal (with respect to BX ) if and only if, for
each x, y, z ∈ X, z ∈ [x, y] implies that either z < x or z < y (or both).
As mentioned above, the rationale underlying single peakedness as unimodality may be plainly
described as follows: an unimodal total preference preorder respects betweenness BX in that it
never regards an intermediate or compromise outcome as strictly worse than both of its ‘extreme’-
generators.
An alternative notion of single peakedness has also been widely adopted in the literature under
several labels including ‘generalized single peakedness’(see e.g. Nehring and Puppe (2007 (a,b)
among others). It will be relabeled here ‘locally strict unimodality’ for the sake of convenience, and
may be formulated as follows in the present setting:
Definition 3. A topped total preorder <∈ TX (with top outcome x
∗) is locally strictly unimodal
(with respect to BX ) if and only if, for each y, z ∈ X, z ∈ [x
∗, y]r {y} implies z ≻ y.
m(i) there exist 0, 1 ∈ A such that m(0, a, 1) = a for all a ∈ A;
m(ii) m(a, b, a) = a for all a, b ∈ A:
m(iii) m(a, b, c) = m(b, a, c) = m(b, c, a) for all a, b, c ∈ A;
m(iv) m(m(a, b, c), d, e) = m(m(a, d, e), b,m(c, d, e)) for all a, b, c, d, e ∈ A.
An alternative characterization of the latticial median is provided by Sholander (1954(a)).
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Remark 2. It is worth noticing here that in the extant literature unimodality and locally
strict unimodality are not always firmly distinguished as they should be. For instance, in a very
interesting and widely cited paper Nehring and Puppe (2007 (b), p.135) quote Moulin (1980) as a
contribution on ‘generalized single peaked’(i.e. locally strictly unimodal) preferences in the case of
a line (but see also Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993) who identify single peakedness and locally
strict unimodality, suggesting that this is precisely the notion underlying Moulin’s work). However,
Moulin’s definition, once reformulated in terms of preferences (as opposed to utilities, as in the
original Moulin (1980), p. 439) amounts to the following requirement: ‘If a is the top outcome
or peak on the line (X,6) then a ≻ x < y if a < x 6 y or y 6 x < a’. Notice however that
this condition is only consistent with unimodality as opposed to locally strict unimodality. To see
this just consider X = {a, x, y} with a < x < y, and total preorder < such that a ≻ x ∼ y: by
construction, < is certainly consistent with Moulin’s condition, and it is in fact unimodal but not
at all locally strictly unimodal (or ‘generalized single peaked’).
By definition, existence of unimodal total preorders with the respect to latticial betweenness BX
on a lattice X = (X,6) is clearly not an issue: for any x ∈ X , the total preorder with x as its
unique top outcome and y ∼ z for any other y, z ∈ X is by construction unimodal. On the other
hand, existence of locally strictly unimodal total preorders with respect to BX requires a more
detailed argument that relies on some specific properties of BX as combined with the following
notions of Suzumura-consistency (henceforth, S-consistency) and non-trivial total extension of a
binary relation:
Definition 4. (a) A binary relation < on X is S-consistent whenever for all x, y ∈ X, if for some
positive integer k there exist z1, ..., zk ∈ X such that x < z1, zk < y and zh < zh+1, h = 1, ..., k − 1
then not y ≻ x;
(b) A binary relation <′ is a non-trivial extension of binary relation < on X if for all x, y ∈ X:
(i) x < y entails x <′ y; (ii) x ≻ y entails x ≻′ y.
The former notions are mutually related thanks to a generalization of Szpilrajn’ theorem on
ordering extensions due to Suzumura, namely:
Suzumura’s Theorem (see e.g. Bossert and Suzumura (2010), Theorem 2.8) A binary relation
< on a set X admits a total preorder as a non-trivial extension if and only if it is S-consistent.
It turns out that the following claim can be quite easily established:
Claim 2. Let X =(X,6) be a (bounded) distributive lattice, BX its (latticial) betweenness
relation as defined above, x ∈ X and ≻x the binary relation on X defined as follows: for all
x, y, z ∈ X , y ≻x z if and only if BX (x, y, z) and y 6= z (i.e. y ∈ [x, z] r {z}). Then ≻x admits
a non-trivial extension <∗xwhich is a locally strictly unimodal total preorder on X with respect to
BX .
Let UX ⊆ TX denote the set of all unimodal total preorders (with respect to BX ), and U
N
X the
set of all N -profiles of unimodal total preorders or full unimodal domain (with respect to BX ).
Similarly, SX ⊆ TX is the set of all locally strictly unimodal total preorders (with respect to BX ),
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and SNX denotes the set of all N -profiles of locally strictly unimodal total preorders or full locally
strictly unimodal domain (with respect to BX ).
A voting rule for (N,X) is a function f : XN → X . For any profile (Yi)i∈N (where Yi ⊆ X for all
i ∈ N) a restricted voting rule for (N,X) is a function f : Πi∈NYi → X . The following properties
of a voting rule will play a crucial role in the ensuing analysis:
Definition 5. A voting rule f : Πi∈NYi → X is BX -monotonic if and only if for all xN =
(xj)j∈N ∈ Y
N , i ∈ N and x′i ∈ Y : f(xN ) ∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})].
Definition 6. For any i ∈ N , let Di ⊆ UX such that top(<) ∈ Yi for all <∈ Di. Then, f :
Πi∈NYi → X is (individually) strategy-proof on Πi∈NDi ⊆ U
N
X if and only if, for all xN ∈ Πi∈NYi
, i ∈ N and x′ ∈ Yi, and for all < = (<j)j∈N ∈ Πi∈NDi, f(top(<i), xNr{i}) <i f(x
′, xNr{i}).
Definition 7. For any i ∈ N , let Di ⊆ UX such that top(<) ∈ Yi for all <∈ Di. Then, f :
Πi∈NYi → X is coalitionally strategy-proof on Πi∈NDi ⊆ U
N
X if and only if for all xN ∈
Πi∈NYi , C ⊆ N and x
′
C ∈ Πi∈CYi, and for all < = (<j)j∈N ∈ Πi∈NDi, there exists i ∈ C such
that f(xN ) <i f(x
′
C , xNrC).
The following properties of voting rules will also be considered in the ensuing analysis.
A voting rule f : Πi∈NYi → X is (weakly) efficient if and only if for all (<j)j∈N ∈ Πi∈NDi ⊆ U
N
X
and y ∈ X , y /∈ f((top(<j)j∈N )) if there exists x ∈ X such that x ≻j y for all j ∈ N , anonymous
if f((xj)j∈N )) = f((xσ(j))j∈N )) for all xN ∈ X
N and all permutations σ : N → N , locally JI-
neutral on Y ⊆ X if f((τ jk(xi))i∈N ) = τ jk(f((xi)i∈N )) for all yN ∈ Y
N and j, k ∈ JX ∩Y (where
τ jk : Y → Y is the elementary permutation of Y such that τ jk(j) = k, τ jk(k) = j and τ jk(x) = x
for any x 6= j, k), locally sovereign on Y ⊆ X if for all z ∈ Y there exists yN ∈ Y
N such that
f(yN) = z, and locally idempotent on Y ⊆ X if f(yN) = z for each yN ∈ Y
N such that yi = z
for all i ∈ N .
A generalized committee in N is a set of coalitions C ⊆ P(N) such that T ∈ C if T ⊆ N and
S ⊆ T for some S ∈ C ( a committee in N being a non-empty generalized committee in N which
does not include the empty coalition)13.
A generalized committee voting rule is a function f : Πi∈NYi → X such that, for some fixed
generalized committee C ⊆ P(N) and for all yN ∈ Πi∈NYi, f(yN) = ∨S∈C(∧i∈Sxi).
A generalized weak committee voting rule is a function f : Πi∈NYi → X such that, for
some fixed generalized committee C ⊆ P(N) and some fixed family {zS : zS ∈ X}S∈C , and for all
yN ∈ Πi∈NYi, f(yN ) = ∨S∈C((∧i∈Sxi) ∧ yS).
Two notable classes of strategy-proof voting rules are the projections (or dictatorial rules) pii :
Y N → X , i ∈ N where for all yN ∈ Y
N , pii(yN ) = yi, and the constant rules fx : Y
N → X , x ∈ X
where for all yN ∈ Y
N , fx(yN ) = x. It is also easily checked that both dictatorial and constant rules
are BX -monotonic.
14
The representation of BX -monotonic voting rules as behaviour maps of certain tree automata
acting on suitably labelled trees will play a key role in the present paper. In that connection, a few
13Thus, a generalized committee is just an order filter of the partially ordered set (P(N),⊆) of coalitions of N .
14Indeed, for all xN = (xj)j∈N ∈ Y
N , i ∈ N and x′i ∈ Y : f(xN ) = xi ∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] if f is the i-th
projection, and f(xN ) = f(x
′
i, xNr{i}) ∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] if f is a constant function.
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supplementary definitions are to be introduced here concerning precisely certain tree automata and
their behaviour (see Ada´mek and Trnkova´ (1990) for a thorough treatment of tree automata).
A Σ-tree automaton is a general model of a mechanism that can perform certain operations
on its ‘internal’ state space, and produce certain observable outputs as a response to certain inputs
it is equipped to detect and act upon once it is suitably prepared to do so, or initialized. The
operations a tree automaton is able to perform are algebraic or finitary (i.e. each of them applies to
some fixed finite number of arguments, its ‘arity’), and are recorded together with their respective
‘arities’ by the automaton’s type, denoted Σ. The inputs of a tree automaton of a certain type
Σ are finite trees with some terminal nodes labelled by variables of a certain set I that have to
be initialized, whereas all the other terminal nodes are labelled by (symbols of) operations as
recorded by type Σ (such trees are also denoted here as finite (Σ, I)-trees). The initialization of
the automaton assigns one specific state to every variable of I and so makes it possible for the
automaton to start its action on any suitable tree-input. A tree-input dictates the admissible (and
mutually equivalent) sequences of operations to be performed by the automaton as it inspects its
nodes moving backward from the terminal nodes. The final outcome of that sequence of operations
or run of the initialized tree automaton produces as an end-result the state which is computed
performing the operation labelled by the initial node or root of the tree as applied to the outcomes
of its previous computations. The output function then works as an ‘effector’ that transforms the
final state thus obtained into an observable output. The behaviour of a Σ-tree automaton denotes
precisely the rule that transforms each (Σ, I)-tree-input into a certain observable output through
the process just described (see Appendix 3 for a formal definition of Σ-tree automata and all the
relevant details).
Actually, we shall be concerned with latticial median -or l-median- tree automata. A (non-
initial) l-median tree automaton Aµ=(X, {ds}s∈Σ , Y, h) -also denoted as Σ
µ-tree automaton-
is a (non-initial) Σ-tree automaton with Σ = Σµ comprising a unique ternary operation symbol sµ
denoting the median operation µ of a distributive lattice15 X = (X,6) and a set of nullary operation
symbols corresponding to some of the terminal nodes of the labelled trees to be computed by the
automaton, namely Σµ = ({sµ} ∪ S0, α) with α : {sµ} ∪ S0 → Z+ such that α(sµ) = 3, α(s) = 0
for each s ∈ S0 and dsµ = µ . Given our present focus on a fixed population N of agents of size
n = |N | we may conveniently take S0 such that |S0| = 2+2
n: the elements of S0 correspond to 0, 1
(standing, respectively, for the bottom and top elements of the lattice) and to 2n ‘phantom votes’,
one for each coalition. We can also posit Y = X and h = id i.e. we take states to be observable
hence we can identify state and output spaces: it follows that in the ensuing analysis we may safely
identify, with a slight abuse of language, the (non-initial) Σµ-tree automaton Aµ and a Σ
µ-algebra
on X . An initial Σµ-tree automaton AI,λµ amounts to a Σ
µ-tree automaton as supplemented with
an initialization λ : I → X i.e. an interpretation in X of variables in I: here, we take |I| = n, and
the initialization λ models a particular ballot profile. Therefore, AI,λµ embodies an interpretation
in X of all terminal nodes of any finite labelled (Σµ, I)-tree T and is ready to compute an output
of T in X -the behaviour of Aµ at T -as given by the value A
I,λ
µ (T ) of its run map at T . Thus,
the behaviour of median Σµ-tree automaton Aµ at any finite labelled (Σ
µ, I)-tree T is the outcome
of a nested sequence of medians µ(........µ(µ(u, xi, z), xi, µ(u
′, xi, z
′)).......) starting with medians of
15Namely, a ternary operation on X satisfying Birkhoff-Kiss axioms m(i)-m(ii)-m(iii)-m(iv) (see Note 12 above).
14 ERNESTO SAVAGLIO♮ AND STEFANO VANNUCCI‡,
projections xi of xN , i = 1, ..., n and the 2
n elements of S0 ⊆ X as dictated by T in the following
manner. Terminal nodes of paths of maximum length l come by construction in 2n−1 triples that
share an immediate predecessor labelled by sµ i.e. the symbol of the (latticial) median operation.
The nodes of any such triple are labelled by xn and two distinct elements of S0. For any k ≤ l− 1,
the terminal nodes of paths of length l− k are labelled by xn−k (the example below provides a very
simple illustration with n = 3).
Example 10. Let X = (X,6) be a distributive lattice with bottom and top elements denoted
by ⊥ and ⊤, respectively, and f : X3 → X the voting rule for ({1, 2, 3} , X) defined as follows: for
any x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ X
3,
f(xN ) = µ(µ(µ(f(⊥,⊥,⊥), x3, f(⊥,⊥,⊤)), x2, µ(f(⊥,⊤,⊥), x3, f(⊥,⊤,⊤))),
x1, µ(µ(f(⊤,⊥,⊥), x3, f(⊤,⊥,⊤)), x2, µ(f(⊤,⊤,⊥), x3, f(⊤,⊤,⊤)))) .
Then, f is l-median tree-automata representable: to see this, just consider for any x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈
X3 the corresponding labelled tree
Thus, we say that a voting rule is representable by a (finitary) l-median tree automaton-or l-
median tree-automata representable (l-MTAR) - if it can be regarded as the behaviour of
some median Σ-tree automaton Aµ as properly initialized and acting on suitably labelled trees.
That is made precise by the following:
Definition 8. (l-median tree-automata representable (l-MTAR) voting rules) Let X =
(X,6) be a bounded distributive lattice. Then, a voting rule f : XN −→ X is l-median tree-
automata representable (l-MTAR) if there exists a Σµ-tree automaton Aµ such that for any
xN ∈ X
N and any finite labelled (Σµ, I)-tree T there is a corresponding initial Σµ-tree automaton
AI,λµ with f(xN ) = A
I,λ
µ (T ).
We are now ready to state the main result of this paper concerning the characterization of
strategy-proof voting rules on unimodal profiles. Our characterization result relies on the following
three lemmas.
The first lemma simply establishes the equivalence between BX -monotonicity with respect to an
arbitrary distributive lattice X and strategy-proofness on the corresponding full unimodal domain
UNX .
Lemma 1. Let X = (X,6) be a distributive lattice, and f : XN → X a voting rule for (N,X).
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) f is BX -monotonic;
(ii) f is strategy-proof on UNX ;
(iii) f is strategy-proof on SNX .
Remark 3. Lemma 1 above extends Lemma 1 of Danilov (1994) (concerning linear orders in
a tree that are unimodal with respect to tree-betweenness). It also extends Proposition 3.2 of
Nehring and Puppe (2007 (a)) (concerning locally strictly unimodal domains in a finite distributive
-actually, Boolean-lattice) since it holds for both the (full) unimodal and the (full) locally strictly
unimodal domain in any distributive lattice (including infinite and non-boolean ones). However,
strictly speaking, Lemma 1 is not a generalization of Nehring and Puppe’s result since the latter
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concerns all social choice functions (not just voting rules), and any ‘rich’ locally strictly unimodal
subdomain.
Observe that a restricted voting rule may be strategy-proof on its restricted unimodal domain
while being not monotonic (i.e. the implications from (ii) or (iii) to (i) of the previous lemma do
not hold in general for restricted voting rules).
To see this, consider the following example, adapted from Barbera`, Berga and Moreno (2010),
and slightly simplified: take X = {a, b, c, d} with a, b, c, d mutually distinct, ∆X = {(x, x) : x ∈ X},
6
∗= {(a, b), (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d), (d, c)} ∪∆X ,
i.e. X ∗ = (X,6∗) is the 4-chain.
Then, posit <= (a ≻ b ≻ c ∼ d)
<′= (d ≻′ b ≻′ c ∼′ a)
<′′= (a ≻′′ b ≻′′ c ≻′′ d)
<′′′= (d ≻′′′ b ≻′′′ c ≻′′′ a)
D = {<,<′}, D′ = {<′′,<′′′}, Y = {a, d} and define f ′ : Y 2 ×XNr{1,2} → X by the following
rule: for all xNr{1,2} ∈ X
Nr{1,2},
f ′(a, a, xNr{1,2}) = a, f
′(d, d, xNr{1,2}) = d,
f ′(a, d, xNr{1,2}) = b, f
′(d, a, xNr{1,2}) = c.
First, observe that both < and <′ are in UNX , i.e. are unimodal, while <
′′and <′′′ are locally
strictly unimodal: indeed, top(<) = top(<′′) = a, top(<′) = top(<′′′) = d and it is immediately seen
that:
BX =
{
(a, b, c), (a, b, d), (a, d, c), (b, d, c),
(c, b, a), (d, b, a), (c, d, a), (c, d, b)
}
∪
{
(x, y, z) ∈ X3 : x = y or z = y
}
.
But then, since {(b, c), (b, d), (d, c)} ∪∆X is a subrelation of < and {(b, c), (b, a), (d, a), (d, c)} ∪∆X
is a subrelation of <′, it follows that unimodality of < and <′with respect to BX holds. Moreover,
f ′ is by construction strategy-proof on D2 × U
Nr{1,2}
X (and on (D
′)2 × S
Nr{1,2}
X ) : to check this,
notice that 1 and 2 are the only non-dummy voters, and for all xNr{1,2} ∈ X
Nr{1,2},
f ′(a, a, xNr{1,2}) < f
′(d, a, xNr{1,2}), f
′(a, d, xNr{1,2}) < f
′(d, d, xNr{1,2}),
f ′(a, a, xNr{1,2}) < f
′(a, d, xNr{1,2}), f
′(d, a, xNr{1,2}) < f
′(d, d, xNr{1,2}),
and similarly
f ′(d, a, xNr{1,2}) <
′
f ′(a, a, xNr{1,2}), f
′(d, d, xNr{1,2}) <
′ f ′(a, d, xNr{1,2}),
f ′(a, d, xNr{1,2}) <
′ f ′(a, a, xNr{1,2}), f
′(d, d, xNr{1,2}) <
′ f ′(d, a, xNr{1,2}),
whence strategy-proofness of f ′ on D2×U
Nr{1,2}
X follows (strategy proofness on (D
′)2×S
Nr{1,2}
X
follows from the same argument by replacing <′′and <′′′for < and <′, respectively).
However, observe that f ′(d, a, xNr{1,2}) = c /∈ [d, a] = [d, f
′(a, a, xNr{1,2})] hence f
′ is not
BX -monotonic.
The next lemma ensures that in an arbitrary distributive lattice the median operation as applied
to voting rules does preserve BX -monotonicity.
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Lemma 2. Let X = (X,6) be a distributive lattice, and f : XN → X, g : XN → X, h :
XN → X voting rules that are BX -monotonic. Then µ(f, g, h) : X
N → X (where µ(f, g, h)(xN ) =
µ(f(xN ), g(xN ), h(xN )) for all xN ∈ X
N ) is also BX -monotonic.
Finally, the next lemma - that only concerns bounded distributive lattices - provides a canonical
median-based representation of all monotonic voting rules hence - in view of Lemma 1 above - of all
strategy-proof voting rules on the corresponding full unimodal domain. That lemma relies on the
notion of a tree automaton as defined above.
Lemma 3. Let X = (X,6) be a bounded distributive lattice and f : XN → X a BX -monotonic
voting rule. Then, f is l-median tree-automata representable (l-MTAR).
The main implications of the foregoing lemmas are indeed summarized by the following:
Theorem 1. Let X = (X,6) be a bounded distributive lattice, BX its latticial betweenness relation,
and f : XN → X a voting rule for (N,X). Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) f is BX -monotonic;
(ii) f is strategy-proof on UNX ;
(iii) f is strategy-proof on SNX ;
(iv) f is l-MTAR;
(v) f is a generalized weak committee voting rule.
Remark 4. Notice that Theorem 1 generalizes Moulin’s characterization of strategy-proof vot-
ing rules on (full) unimodal domains in bounded chains to arbitrary bounded distributive lattices.
Thus, it also offers a direct extension to all bounded distributive lattices of Moulin’s original lattice-
polynomial representation of strategy-proof voting rules to be contrasted with the alternative char-
acterization via families of ‘left-coalition systems’ on (full) locally strictly unimodal domains in
products of bounded chains due to Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993), which relies heavily on the
product-structure of the underlying lattices. In particular, Theorem 1 implies strategy-proofness of
the simple majority voting rule on unimodal domains (with an odd population of voters), since it
can be quite easily shown that the former is BX -monotonic (see e.g. Monjardet (1990) for a formal
definition and study of the simple majority or extended median rule in a latticial framework). It
follows that in an arbitrary bounded distributive lattice there exist voting rules - such as the simple
majority rule - that jointly satisfy anonymity (i.e. symmetric treatment of voters), neutrality (i.e.
symmetric treatment of outcomes), idempotence (i.e. faithful respect of unanimity of votes) and
strategy-proofness on the full unimodal domain.
It can also be established, however, that strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-proofness of
a voting rule are not equivalent on unimodal domains in bounded distributive lattices. This is made
precise by the following:
Theorem 2. Let X = (X,6) be a bounded distributive lattice. Then the following holds:
(i) if |X | ≥ 4 then there exists a sublattice Y = (Y,6Y ) of X (with |Y | ≥ 4), subdomains D ⊆ UX
and D′ ⊆ SX , and a restricted voting rule f
′ : Y 2 × XNr{1,2} → X that is strategy-proof on
D2 ×U
Nr{1,2}
X and on (D
′)2 × S
Nr{1,2}
X but not coalitionally strategy-proof on D
2 ×U
Nr{1,2}
X or on
(D′)2 × S
Nr{1,2}
X ;
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(ii) if |X | ≥ 4 and X is not a linear order then there exists a sublattice Y = (Y,6Y ) of X (with
|Y | ≥ 4) and a voting rule f ′ : Y N → Y that is strategy-proof on UNY and on S
N
Y but not coalitionally
strategy-proof on UNY or on S
N
Y .
Notice that if f : XN → X is strategy-proof on UNX and |X | ≤ 3 then f is also coalitionally
strategy-proof on UNX : that implication follows from a straightforward adaptation of the proof of
Theorem 1 of Barbera`, Berga and Moreno (2010) to voting rules as combined with Proposition 1 of
the same paper.
Moreover, as a further straightforward consequence of Theorem 2 (and of a few previously known
results), we have the following:
Corollary 1. Let X = (X,6) be a bounded distributive lattice. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(i) for each sublattice Y = (Y,6|Y ) of X and each voting rule f : Y
N → Y , f is strategy-proof
on UNY (on on S
N
Y , respectively) if and only if it is also coalitionally strategy-proof on U
N
Y (on on
UNY , respectively);
(ii) X = (X,6) is a linear order.
Thus, we have here a remarkable characterization of bounded linear orders as the only bounded
distributive lattices where equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness of voting rules
on full unimodal domains holds.
Indeed, the failure of equivalence between simple and coalitional strategy-proofness pointed out
by Theorem 2 is readily extended to an impossibility result concerning availability of anonymous and
idempotent coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules for full unimodal domains(and locally strictly
unimodal domains) in a very general class of bounded distributive lattices, even if (full) neutrality
is dropped. That is made precise by the following
Theorem 3. Let X = (X,6) be a bounded distributive lattice with at least two distinct atoms
x, z ∈ X and Y = (Y,6Y ) the sublattice of X induced by the restriction of 6 to Y = {0, x, z, x ∨ z}.
Then, there is no anonymous voting rule f : XN → X which is locally sovereign and locally JI-
neutral on Y , and coalitionally strategy-proof on UNX , or on S
N
X .
Thus, in sharp contrast to what happens in chains, no anonymous coalitionally strategy-proof
voting rules are available on standard full unimodal or locally strictly unimodal domains in bounded
distributive lattices with at least two atoms, including Boolean k-hypercubes with k > 1, even
if an extended median-based aggregation rule is well-defined, and (weak) efficiency or even (full)
sovereignty are not required at all.
4. A simple example: single peakedness and strategy-proofness in the Boolean
square
Consider a five-member committee N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} facing a decision problem concerning the
formal requirements for candidates to fill a certain top corporate position. The committee is
to decide whether (1) Mild -or Strict, i.e. more specific and demanding- formal qualifications
and/or (2) Medium -or High- seniority are to be required of candidates. The outcome set is
then {(Mild,Medium), (Mild,High), (Strict,Medium), (Strict,High)}: denoting both Mild and
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Medium by 0 and both Strict and High by 1 the outcome set can be represented by the Boolean
square 22 = ({0, 1, x, y} ,6) where 0 = (0, 0) denotes the bottom element, 1 = (1, 1) denotes the top
element, while x = (1, 0) and y = (0, 1) are not comparable. The latticial betweenness relation of
22 as defined by the rule [(a, c, b) ∈ B22 iff a ∧ b 6 c 6 a ∨ b] -where ∧ and ∨ denote, respectively,
the meet and join of 22- is
B22 =


(0, x, 1), (0, y, 1), (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, x, 0), (1, y, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0),
(x, 0, y), (x, 1, y), (x, x, y), (x, y, y), (y, 0, x), (y, 1, x), (y, x, x), (y, y, x),
(0, 0, x), (0, x, x), (x, 0, 0), (x, x, 0), (0, 0, y), (0, y, y), (y, 0, 0), (y, y, 0),
(x, x, 1), (x, 1, 1), (1, x, x), (1, 1, x), (y, y, 1), (y, 1, 1), (1, y, y), (1, 1, y)


.
An unimodal total preorder for 22 is a total preorder < on {0, 1, x, y} with a unique maximum
that ‘respects’ B22 , namely such that for any (a, c, b) ∈ B22 either c < a or c < b (or both). Then, if
the complement of any element a is denoted a′, it is easily checked that the unimodal total preorders
on 22 are precisely three for each possible choice of the top outcome a ∈ {0, x, y, 1} = {a, a′, b, b′}
(hence twelve altogether), namely
<1≡ a ≻1 b ≻1 b
′ ∼1 a
′ , <2≡ a ≻2 b
′ ≻2 b ∼2 a
′ , <3≡ a ≻3 b ∼3 b
′ ∼3 a
′ .
Indeed, the essential feature of an unimodal total preorder on B22 is simply the following: it
must be the case that no second-best is both a complement of the first-best and strictly better than
some other outcome.
A voting rule f is B22-monotonic if -for any agent i and any profile z−i of the other agents’ votes-
i’s vote for u ensures an outcome f(u, z−i) that lies between u and f(v, z−i) for any choice of v in
{0, 1, x, y}.
The extended median or simple majority rule µ∗ : {0, 1, x, y}5 → {0, 1, x, y} is defined as follows:
for any (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) ∈ {0, x, y, 1}
5
,
µ∗(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = ∨T⊆N,|T |≥3(∧i∈T ai).
Since projections fi(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = ai , i = 1, ..., 5 are obviously B22-monotonic, and as
shown below (see Lemma 2) the median preserves B22-monotonicity, it follows that the median
µ : {0, 1, x, y}
3
→ {0, 1, x, y} as defined by the rule µ(a, b, c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ c) ∨ (a ∧ c) is also B22-
monotonic. (It can also be easily checked that on the Boolean square the median is also efficient,
since no outcome with zero votes can be selected by µ: that property, however, fails in higher
dimensional Boolean hypercubes).
Now, it turns out that both the join and the meet of any (a, b) ∈ {0, x, y, 1}2 (and therefore
the join and the meet of any finite subset of {0, x, y, 1}) are representable as the median (iterated
median, respectively) of two projections and one constant, namely
a ∨ b = (a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ 1) ∨ (a ∧ 1) = µ(a, b, 1) and
a ∧ b = (a ∧ b) ∨ (b ∧ 0) ∨ (a ∧ 0) = µ(a, b, 0).
Since constants (when regarded as constant functions) are obviouslyB22 -monotonic, it also follows
(from the B22-monotonicity preservation property of the median as mentioned above) that joins
and meets of any finite subset of {0, x, y, 1} may be reduced to iterated medians of projections and
constants, and are therefore also B22-monotonic. The same argument applies in particular to the
extended median or simple majority rule µ∗ to conclude that µ∗ is B22-monotonic (with n = 5
voters a direct check is of course still manageable, but the computation starts to become quite long
and tedious).
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Thus, since Theorem 1 implies that the strategy-proof voting rules for (N, {0, x, y, 1}) on the full
unimodal domain of total preorders in the Boolean square are precisely the B22-monotonic functions
on {0, x, y, 1}
N
, it follows that µ∗ itself is in fact strategy-proof on that unimodal domain (along
with all the B22-monotonic functions on {0, x, y, 1}
5
).
Next, consider the following profile of total preorders:
<1=<2≡ (x ≻ 1 ≻ 0 ∼ y), <3=<4≡ (y ≻ 1 ≻ 0 ∼ x), <5≡ (0 ≻ x ≻ y ∼ 1).
That profile is obviously unimodal with respect to B22 (see the definition above) since no second-
best outcome is a complement of its first-best, and it is easily checked that
µ∗(x, x, y, y, 0) = 0, whereas µ∗(1, 1, 1, 1, 0) = 1.
It follows that coalition {1, 2, 3, 4} can successfully manipulate µ∗ at that preference profile,
namely the simple majority rule is not coalitionally strategy-proof on the full unimodal domain with
respect to the latticial betweenness relation B22 (Theorem 2 shows that such a situation always
occurs whenever the underlying bounded distributive lattice is not a chain). And all of the above
can be generalized to an impossibility result: no anonymous voting rule enjoying a modicum of
neutrality/sovereignty is coalitionally strategy-proof on unimodal domains in bounded distributive
lattices that -like finite Boolean lattices (or hypercubes) 2m, m ≥ 2, and unlike chains- have at least
two distinct atoms i.e. two elements that cover the bottom element (this is the content of Theorem
3).
To the the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of those results on the Boolean square is available
in the previous literature on strategy-proofness and single peakedness, and the same holds for
counterparts of them under other notions of single peakedness. Partial results implying or suggesting
some counterparts of Theorems 2 and 3 for finite Boolean lattices 2m, m ≥ 3 under alternative
notions of single peakedness are indeed available (including results on separable preferences, that
are usually not presented as an instance of a single peaked domain but can be, as shown below):
see e.g. Nehring and Puppe (2007(a),(b)), and Barbera´, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991). It should
be stressed again, however, that such results -while interesting and valuable by themselves- are
independent and at least in one respect narrower than those presented in the present work. That
is so because the former not only ignore at all the unimodal case, but even in the locally strict
unimodal case fail to cover -as opposed to Theorems 2 and 3 below- infinite lattices and the Boolean
square (i.e. the finite Boolean case with m = 2). Furthermore, it should be stressed that locally
strict unimodality is somewhat at odds with a latticial outcome set. That is so because it relies on a
notion of proximity-based betweenness-consistency that cannot be backed by any metric consistent
with standard latticial betweenness relations without allowing for multiple local peaks.
In order to clarify those statements, it is worth reviewing here the sort of betweenness relations
underlying such alternative notions of single peakedness.
The most widely used alternative version of single peakedness encountered in the extant literature
requires that (i) there exist a unique maximum or best outcome, and (ii) any outcome x that lies
between the best outcome and another outcome y distinct from x itself should also be strictly better
than y (see e.g. Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993), and Nehring and Puppe (2007 (a,b)). It is
easily checked that under such notion of single peakedness (labeled ‘general single peakedness’ in
Nehring and Puppe (2007 (b)) and ‘locally strict unimodality’ in the present paper) as applied to
(the relevant part of) latticial betweenness, single peaked total preorders on 22 are -again- three
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for each possible choice of the top outcome a ∈ {0, x, y, 1} = {a, a′, b, b′} (hence twelve altogether),
namely
<′1≡ a ≻
′
1 b ≻1 b
′ ≻′1 a
′ , <′2≡ a ≻
′
2 b
′ ≻′2 b ≻
′
2 a
′ , <′3≡ a ≻
′
3 b ∼
′
3 b
′ ≻′3 a
′ .
Thus, as it is immediately checked, unimodal and locally strict unimodal total preorders comprise
two disjoint sets.
Indeed, under locally strict unimodality, it is still possible to claim that every single voter’s
preferences are ‘consistent’ with the same betweenness relation, namely the latticial betweenness
B22 . However, the implied ‘consistency’ is formulated in such a way that only certain parts of
B22 play an active role in shaping preferences, and distinct parts of it play such an active role for
agents having distinct top outcomes. In particular, and most remarkably, for each locally strictly
unimodal total preorder < on 22 with top outcome a both b ≻ a′ and b′ ≻ a′ hold, while of
course (b, a′, b′) ∈ B22 : therefore, when applied to B22 in its entirety, locally strictly unimodal
total preorders actually admit two local peaks. That fact strongly suggests that if locally strictly
unimodal total preorders are to be regarded as single peaked with respect to some betweenness
relation on 22, then claiming that role for the entire latticial betweenness B22 , while being of course
a legitimate stipulation is arguably somewhat far-fetched. A far more natural and appropriate choice
for that role would be apparently its proper subrelation Ba
22
= B22 r {(b, a, b
′), (b′, a, b)}. Observe,
however, that such an approach would result in a ‘non-classic’ notion of single peakedness that makes
reference to several preference-dependent hence, generally speaking, agent-dependent betweenness
relations (one for each possible best outcome).
To be sure, there is still another possibility to anchor all locally strictly unimodal total preorders
to a common betweenness relation: that would entail choosing another proper subrelation of B22 ,
namelyB∗
22
= B22r{(x, 1, y), (y, 1, x), (x, 0, y), (y, 0, x)} as the relevant betweenness relation. Notice
that B∗
22
is in fact the natural betweenness relation of 22 when regarded not as a (Boolean) lattice,
but just as a partially ordered set : thus, outcome b is declared to lie between a and c if and
only if either a 6 b 6 c or c 6 b 6 a hold (the hallmark of order betweenness is that no third
outcome lies between two incomparable elements). That move would enlarge the set of locally
strictly unimodal total preorders, collapsing locally strict unimodality to uniqueness of the best
outcome whenever the best outcome is either x or y: in that case, we would end up with a notion
of single peakedness for total preorders that relies on a unique shared betweenness relation but is
itself essentially preference-dependent anyway. In any case, that choice of the relevant betweenness
would be at variance with a full fledged treatment of outcome set 22 as a (distributive) lattice. It
would result in a considerable relaxation of single peakednees restrictions, and a strengthening of
the relevant notion of monotonicity, to the effect of rendering the median function not monotonic.16
Separable preferences on 22 (a notion due to Barbera´, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) who define
it for arbitrary finite Boolean lattices) are best introduced by regarding 22 as the power set of a two-
item set {x, y} with x and y denoting singletons {x} and {y}, and the empty set ∅ and {x, y} itself
standing for 0 and 1, respectively. Any item a ∈ {x, y} is either ‘good’ or ‘bad’: it is good if {a} ≻ ∅
and bad if ∅ ≻ {a}. The set of all good items of a total preorder < on 22 is denoted by G(<). A
total preorder < on 22 is separable if for any A ⊆ {x, y} and a ∈ {x, y} r A, A ∪ {a} ≻ A if and
16To see this, consider for instance (x, y, 1) and (y, y, 1). Clearly, µ(x, y, 1) = 1 , µ(y, y, 1) = y and not B∗
22
(x, 1, y)
hence µ is not B∗
22
-monotonic, and no B∗
22
-counterpart of Theorem 1 below applies to it.
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only if a ∈ G(<). Clearly, for any separable total preorder < on 22, G(<) is the unique maximum of
<. Resuming now for the sake of comparisons the standard notation used in the former discussion,
the separable total preorders are three for each possible choice of the best outcome (that is, recall,
the set of all good items), namely
<′′1≡ a ≻
′′
1 b ≻
′′
1 b
′ ≻′′1 a
′ , <′′2≡ a ≻
′′
2 b
′ ≻′′2 b ≻
′′
2 a
′ , <′′3≡ a ≻
′′
3 b ∼
′′
3 b
′ ≻′′3 a
′
where a denotes the set of all good items, a′ is the complement of a, and b′ is the complement of
b.
Notice that on 22 separable preferences are isomorphic to locally strictly unimodal preferences.17
Thus, separable preferences are just locally strictly unimodal preferences on finite Boolean lattices in
disguise. It follows that the same observations made on the latter also apply to separable preferences:
precisely as locally strictly unimodal preferences, separable preferences can be regarded as single
peaked either with respect to multiple, agent-dependent betweenness relations or with respect to a
common betweenness relation. In both cases, however, the betweenness relations involved and playing
an active role depend on preferences, are distinct from latticial betweenness B22 and, arguably, do
disregard in relevant ways the latticial structure of the outcome set.
5. Related literature and concluding remarks
The main results of the present paper may be summarized as follows:
(i) Theorem 1 provides a characterization in terms of iterated medians of projections and con-
stants of the class of strategy-proof voting rules on (full) unimodal domains and locally strictly
unimodal domains in all bounded distributive lattices : thus, combining a version of the original
Moulin’s lattice-polynomial representation with a suitable generalization of ideas and techniques
proposed by Danilov (1994) through an explicit reliance on tree automata, it extends in significant
ways both Moulin (1980) and Danilov (1994) (which only concern unimodal domains in bounded
chains and in bounded trees, respectively), and Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993) and Nehring
and Puppe (2007 (a),(b)) (which only concern locally strictly unimodal domains in finite products
of bounded chains and in finite distributive lattices, respectively).
(ii) Theorem 2 establishes that equivalence between (individual) strategy-proofness and coalitional
strategy-proofness on both full unimodal and full locally strictly unimodal domains holds precisely in
bounded linear orders, and fails in bounded distributive lattices that are not linear orders : it comple-
ments the opposite results obtained by Moulin (1980) and Danilov (1994) for full unimodal domains
in bounded chains and trees and by Barbera`, Berga and Moreno (2010) for locally strictly unimodal
domains in bounded chains, and extends previous results obtained by Barbera`, Sonnenschein and
Zhou (1991) and Nehring and Puppe (2007 (a),(b)) for locally strictly unimodal domains in certain
finite distributive lattices.
(iii) Theorem 3 establishes -for bounded distributive lattices with at least two atoms- the impos-
sibility of anonymous coalitional strategy-proof voting rules with even a minimal amount of local
sovereignty and local neutrality on full unimodal domains: it also extends to a large subclass of non-
sovereign voting rules for full unimodal and locally strictly unimodal domains in a much larger class
of bounded distributive lattices some previous results mainly due to Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti
(1993) and Nehring and Puppe (2007 (a), (b)) concerning voting rules for locally strictly unimodal
17The argument can be extended to arbitrary Boolean hypercubes 2m, m ≥ 2.
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domains in certain finite or product distributive lattices (indeed, a distributive lattice with two or
more atoms need not be a product lattice, or finite).
In order to properly appreciate the significance of the foregoing result a few key contributions
from the early literature on related issues are to be discussed in some detail.
The seminal paper by Moulin (see Moulin (1980)) provides an explicit characterization in terms
of ‘extended medians’ of the class of all strategy-proof voting rules on the domain of all profiles
of total preorders that are unimodal with respect to a fixed bounded linear order18. Furthermore,
Moulin (1980) establishes the equivalence of strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-proofness
for all voting rules on such full unimodal domains. Clearly, Moulin’s result does not apply to the
Boolean square. Moreover, its proof cannot be extended to the latter.
In fact, Moulin’s proof relies heavily on the following property of medians in bounded linear orders
that does not hold for medians in general bounded distributive lattices : given an odd population of
n = 2k+1 voters, for any (xi)i=1,...,n ∈ X
N the (extended) median µ∗(x1, ..., xn) i.e. the (iterated)
median µ(x2k, µ(x2(k−1), µ(..(µ(x1, x2, x3))..), x2k−1), x2k+1) is such that:
(5.1) min(|{i ∈ N : xi ≤ µ
∗(x1, ..., xn)}| , |{i ∈ N : µ
∗(x1, ..., xn) ≤ xi}|) ≥ k + 1.
However, take n = 3 (hence k + 1 = 2) and consider the Boolean square 22.
Clearly µ∗(1, x, y) = µ(1, x, y) = 1, hence at (x1, x2, x3) = (1, x, y), |{i ∈ N : xi ≤ µ
∗(1, x, y)}| =
3, but |{i ∈ N : µ∗(1, x, y) ≤ xi}| = 1, and 5.1 fails.
In a similar vein, Danilov (1994) provides a characterization in terms of (iterated) medians of
the class of strategy-proof voting rules on the domain of all unimodal linear orders (i.e. antisym-
metric total preorders) when X is the vertex set of an undirected (bounded) tree (see also Danilov
and Sotskov (2002) for further discussion of this topic, and Demange (1982) for an early study of
majority-like voting rules on domains of unimodal linear orders in undirected trees).19 Moreover,
Danilov (1994) also shows that strategy-proofness and coalitional strategy-proofness of voting rules
on unimodal profiles of linear preference orders in undirected bounded trees are equivalent proper-
ties. But in fact, it can be shown that Danilov’s proofs can be readily extended to the wider full
domain of unimodal total preference preorders (arguing along the lines of the first part of the proof
of Lemma 1 above), and to the case of an underlying bounded linearly ordered set of alternatives.
However, the key step of Danilov’s proof relies on the following property shared by intervals of
linear orders and of undirected trees, namely:
(5.2) for all x, y, v, z ∈ X such that x 6= y, if x ∈ [y, v] and y ∈ [x, z] then x ∈ [v, z].
18To be sure, Moulin proves the characterization result mentioned above for a restricted unimodal domain where
voters are not allowed to regard the maximum or the minimum of the chain as their unique optimum. But Moulin’s
proof can be adapted to the full unimodal domain.
19Danilov’s result can also be reformulated in terms of median tree-automata representable voting rules by suitably
redefining the median operation in order to reflect the characteristic properties of medians of trees (as opposed to
medians of bounded distributive lattices). This can be done replacing axiom m(i) of Birkhoff and Kiss (1947) (see
note 12 above) with
m′(i): for all a, b, c, d,
either m(m(d, a, b), c, d) = m(d, a, c)
or m(m(d, a, b), c, d) = m(d, b, c)
(see Sholander (1952)).
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Notice however that 5.2 does not hold for (latticial) intervals of arbitrary bounded distributive
lattices. To see this, consider again precisely the Boolean square 22 and notice that e.g. b ∈ [a, d],
a ∈ [b, c] but b /∈ [c, d].20
Moulin’s fundamental characterization result also inspired many authors to explore related strategy-
proofness issues on other single peaked domains (including locally strictly unimodal domains). Those
alternative notions of single peakedness typically rely on binary proximity relations. Such proxim-
ity relations are usually jointly induced together with the betweenness relations by an underlying
agent-invariant metric structure hence are agent-invariant and total (see e.g. Border and Jordan
(1983), Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993), Chichilnisky and Heal (1997), Ching (1997), Barbera`,
Masso` and Neme (1997), Peremans, Peters, van der Stel and Storcken (1997), Schummer and Vohra
(2002), Nehring and Puppe (2007(a), 2007(b)), Bordes, Laffond and Le Breton (2012), Chatterji,
Sanver and Sen (2013)). Those works include several characterization results concerning some large
subclass of strategy-proof voting mechanisms on suitably defined single-peaked domains (such as
sovereign i.e. surjective voting rules or social choice functions). Moreover, some of those results
provide valuable information on strategy-proofness properties of voting rules for certain proximity-
based single peaked domains in certain distributive lattices and provide partial counterparts to our
results on coalitional manipulability of median-based rules.
Thus, the existence of sovereign strategy-proof voting rules for Euclidean single peaked domains
that are not coalitionally strategy-proof is well-established for proximity-based single peaked profiles
in Euclidean m-dimensional spaces with m ≥ 2 (see e.g. Border and Jordan (1983), Peters, van der
Stel and Storcken (1992), Peremans, Peters, van der Stel and Storcken (1997), Bordes, Laffond and
Le Breton (2012)). Furthermore, Euclidean spaces are (unbounded) Riesz spaces i.e. are endowed
with a natural (unbounded) distributive latticial structure. Notice however that the betweenness
relation induced by the Euclidean metric is distinct from the latticial betweenness relation and in
fact no well-behaved median operation is available in anm-dimensional Euclidean space with m ≥ 2.
In their influential contribution, Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993) identify single peakedness
and locally strict unimodality and offer an alternative characterization of strategy-proof voting
rules on (full) locally strictly unimodal domains in (finite) products of bounded chains endowed
with the L1-metric
21: their characterization relies on generalized median voter schemes i.e. on
representations of voting rules via families of outcome/dimension-specific generalized committees
denoting winning coalitions. While that work mainly focusses on the finite case, it can be readily
extended to finite products of arbitrary bounded chains. However, it relies heavily on the product
structure of the underlying lattices.
Building upon some remarkable earlier contributions including Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993)
and Barbera`, Masso` and Neme (1997), and also focusing on locally strict unimodality (under the label
‘generalized single peakedness’), Nehring and Puppe (2007(a)) offer a comprehensive study and an
20See e.g. Sholander (1952, 1954(a)), Bandelt and Hedl´ıkova´ (1983) for a thorough study of intervals in general
median algebras, and Isbell (1980) for an even more general approach that also considers intervals in a larger class of
ternary algebras.
21Namely, dL1 (x, y) = Σi|xi − yi| for all x, y ∈ X. The L1-metric is consistent with latticial betweenness in
the sense explained in Remark 1 above. Barbera`, Gul and Stacchetti (1993) also provides a characterization of
strategy-proof social choice rules with range given by a product of sub-chains.
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‘issue-by-issue voting-by-committees’-based characterization of sovereign (i.e. surjective) strategy-
proof voting rules on rich domains of so-called locally strictly unimodal linear orders in certain finite
median interval spaces22 as induced by suitably defined ‘property spaces’. In particular, Nehring and
Puppe (2007 (a), (b)) provide valuable results on locally strict unimodality and strategy-proofness
in finite median spaces, and (finite) distributive lattices are a prominent instance of (finite) median
spaces. However, due to their choice of linear preference domains as combined with their (locally)
strict notion of unimodality, it turns out that their results are in fact irrelevant for the case of
unimodality in finite distributive lattices other than finite chains, as explained in some detail in
Section 2 above. Furthermore, Nehring and Puppe (2007 (b)) prove that the only efficient and
strategy-proof voting rules on ‘rich’ domains of locally strictly unimodal profiles of linear orders
in finite Boolean m-hypercubes with m ≥ 3 are weakly dictatorial. Notice, however, that efficient
voting rules are in particular sovereign hence that result is not in any case an impossibility result for
non-sovereign anonymous and coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules. It should also be stressed
that the main result in Nehring, Puppe (2007 (b)) does entail equivalence-failure for simple and
coalitional strategy-proofness in Boolean k-hypercubes for k ≥ 3 but it refers to a domain of locally
strictly unimodal linear orders that is distinct -and in fact disjoint in any Boolean hypercube- from
the domain of all unimodal total preorders which is the focus of the present work. Moreover, even
on the locally strictly unimodal domain the foregoing result does not apply to the Boolean square,
while our Theorem 2 covers the full unimodal domain in both infinite bounded distributive lattices
and arbitrary Boolean hypercubes, including of course the Boolean square 22.
Another recent paper (Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013)) provides a characterization of those
‘strongly-path-connected’ domains of linear orders that ensure existence of anonymous and idempo-
tent strategy-proof social choice functions for a voter population of even size: such characterization
relies on a new, generalized notion of single-peakedness for linear orders denoted as ‘semi-single-
peakedness’ (requiring essentially that the outcome set can be endowed with a tree structure such
that locally strict unimodality as defined above holds within a certain threshold-distance from the
top outcome). However, the domain of (all) unimodal linear orders on the Boolean square is -as
observed above- empty hence it is trivially not strongly path-connected. Thus, the unimodal domain
is definitely beyond the scope of the Chatterji-Sanver-Sen characterization.
Barbera`, Berga and Moreno (2010) addresses the general issue of equivalence between simple and
coalitional strategy-proofness and consider locally strictly unimodal domains of total preorders.23
They establish that a property they newly introduce and label ‘Sequential Inclusion’ provides a
general sufficient condition ensuring equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness,
and show that locally strictly unimodal domains of total preorders as defined on a linear order
(X,6) do satisfy it. Specifically, for each preference profile (<i)i∈N Sequential Inclusion relies
on a family of binary relations < (S((<i)i∈N , y, z)) as parameterized by ordered pairs (y, z) of
outcomes and defined on S((<i)i∈N , y, z), the set of voters that strictly prefer y to z at (<i)i∈N :
in particular, voter pair (i, j) is in < (S((<i)i∈N , y, z)) if and only if i and j are in S((<i)i∈N , y, z)
and {x ∈ X : z <i x} ⊆ {x ∈ X : z ≻j x}. Of course any such < (S((<i)i∈N , y, z)) is reflexive:
22A median interval space amounts to a set with a ternary betweenness relation such that for any triple of elements
there exists precisely one element which lies between each pair in the triple.
23It should be noticed, however, that locally strict unimodality in a bounded linear order reduces to unimodality
when total preorders are in fact antisymmetric i.e. linear orders: details are available from the authors upon request.
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Sequential Inclusion requires that all of them be also connected and acyclic. Indirect Sequential
Inclusion is satisfied by a profile (<i)i∈N if either (<i)i∈N itself satisfy Sequential Inclusion or for
each pair (y, z) of outcomes there exists a profile (<′i: i ∈ S((<i)i∈N , y, z)) such that: (i) y ≻
′
i z for
each i ∈ S((<i)i∈N , y, z), (ii) z ≻
′
i x for each i ∈ S((<i)i∈N , y, z) and each outcome x 6= z such that
z <i x, and (iii) < (S((<
′
i: i ∈ S((<i)i∈N , y, z))) is connected and acyclic. A preference domain is
then said to satisfy Sequential Inclusion (Indirect Sequential Inclusion) if each preference profile in
that domain does satisfy it.24
Thus, the Barbera`-Berga-Moreno result mentioned above extends to locally strictly unimodal
domains Moulin’s equivalence between individual and coalitional strategy-proofness on unimodal
domains in bounded chains (see also Danilov and Sotskov (2002) and Le Breton and Zaporozhets
(2009) in that connection). Notice, incidentally, that the Barbera`-Berga-Moreno argument for such
an equivalence result cannot be extended to domains of unimodal total preorders even in bounded
linear orders.25
Finally, it should also be noticed that some of the results of the present paper - notably, Lemma
1 - can be easily reproduced in a more general setting e.g. in any median algebra (see Isbell (1980),
Bandelt and Hedl´ıkova´ (1983)). It remains to be seen which of the other results, if any, can also be
lifted to the latter environment. This is however best left as a possible topic for future research.
6. Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Claim 1. (i) If BX (x, z, y) then x ∧ y 6 z 6 x ∨ y . Since by definition x ∧ y = y ∧ x and
x ∨ y = y ∨ x it obviously follows y ∧ x 6 z 6 y ∨ x hence BX (y, z, x) also holds.
(ii) Since by definition x ∧ y 6 x 6 x ∨ y and x ∧ y 6 y 6 x ∨ y hold for any x, y ∈ X , both
BX (x, x, y) and BX (x, y, y) hold.
(iii) If BX (x, y, x) then x = x ∧ x 6 y 6 x ∨ x = x hence y = x.
(iv) If BX (x, u, y), BX (x, v, y) and BX (u, z, v) then x ∧ y 6 u 6 x ∨ y , x ∧ y 6 v 6 x ∨ y and
u ∧ v 6 z 6 u ∨ v.
Thus, by definition of ∧ and ∨, x∧y 6 u∧v 6 x∨y (that implies x∧y 6 z) and x∧y 6 u∨v 6 x∨y
(that implies z 6 x ∨ y). It follows that BX (x, z, y) as required;
(v) If BX (x, y, z) and BX (y, x, z) then x ∧ z 6 y 6 x ∨ z and y ∧ z 6 x 6 y ∨ z hence
x = x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∧ (y ∨ z)) ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z) =
(x ∧ y) ∨ (y ∧ z) ∨ (x ∧ z) = (y ∨ (x ∧ z)) ∨ (x ∧ z) = y ∨ (x ∧ z) = y. 
Proof of Claim 2. First, notice that ≻xis, as suggested by notation, asymmetric: indeed, suppose
not i.e. y ≻x z and z ≻x y for some y, z ∈ X . Then, in particular y ∈ [x, z] and z ∈ [x, y]
hence y = z by antisymmetry of BX as established above, a contradiction. Next, observe that
≻xis S-consistent: to check this, assume that on the contrary there exist y, z, z1, ..., zk such that
24Moreover, it turns out that in our full unimodal setting Indirect Sequential Inclusion is a generalization of a
similar ‘richness’ condition singled out by Le Breton and Zaporozhets (2009).
25Indeed, take a four-element linear order ({x, y,w, z} ,6) such that x < y < z < w , consider total preorders
<1,<2 on X such that x ≻1 y ≻1 w ∼1 z and z ≻2 y ≻1 w ∼1 x : it can be quite easily shown that <1and <2
are unimodal -though of course not strictly unimodal- and violate the ‘Sequential Inclusion’ property. Furthermore,
it can be quite easily checked that the foregoing preference profile also fails to satisfy Indirect Sequential Inclusion
(more details on all of the above are available from the authors upon request).
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y ∈ [x, z1]r {z1} , z1 ∈ [x, z2]r {z2} , ..., zk−1 ∈ [x, zk]r {zk} , zk ∈ [x, z]r {z} and z ∈ [x, y]r {y} .
Then, in particular,
BX (x, y, z1), BX (x, z1, z2), BX (x, z2, z3), ....., BX (x, zk−1, zk), BX (x, zk, z), BX (x, z, y).
It follows, by closure and convexity of BX ,
[x, y] ⊆ [x, z1] ⊆ [x, z2] ⊆ ... ⊆ [x, zk] ⊆ [x, z] ⊆ [x, y]
hence [x, y] = [x, z].
Therefore,
BX (x, z, y) and BX (x, y, z), hence by symmetry BX (y, z, x) and BX (z, y, x) and by antisymmetry
y = z, a contradiction since z ∈ [x, y]r {y}: hence, S-consistency of ≻x is established.
It follows that Suzumura’s Theorem applies and ≻xadmits a non-trivial extension <
∗
xthat is a
total preorder. Moreover, since ≻xis asymmetric, ≻x⊆≻
∗
xhence by construction <
∗
xis locally strictly
unimodal as required. 
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) ⇒ (ii) Let f be BX -monotonic with respect to X . Now, consider any
< = (<j)j∈N ∈ U
N
X and any i ∈ N . By definition of BX -monotonicity f(top(<i), xNr{i}) ∈ [top(<i
), f(xi, xNr{i})] for all xNr{i} ∈ X
Nr{i} and xi ∈ X . But then, since clearly
top(<i) <i f(top(<i), xNr{i}), either f(top(<i), xNr{i}) = top(<i) or f(top(<i), xNr{i}) <i
f(xi, xNr{i}) by unimodality of <i. Hence, f(top(<i), xNr{i}) <i f(xi, xNr{i}) in any case. It
follows that f is indeed strategy-proof on UNX .
(ii)⇒ (i) Let us assume that f : XN → X is not BX -monotonic: thus, there exist i ∈ N , x
′
i ∈ X
and xN = (xi)i∈N ∈ X
N such that f(xN ) /∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]. Then, consider the total preorder
<∗ on X defined as follows: xi = top(<
∗) and for all y, z ∈ X r {xi}, y <
∗ z if and only if (i)
{y, z} ⊆ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]r {xi} or (ii) y ∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]r {xi} and z /∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] or
(iii) y /∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] and z /∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]. Clearly, by construction <
∗consists of three
indifference classes with {xi}, [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]r {xi} and X r [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] as top, medium
and bottom indifference classes, respectively. Now, observe that <∗∈ UX . To check this statement,
take any y, z, v ∈ X such that y 6= z and v ∈ [y, z] (if y = z then v = y = z and there is in fact
nothing to prove). If {y, z} ⊆ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] then BX (xi, v, f(x
′
i, xNr{i}) by convexity of BX , i.e.
v ∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]. v by construction xi∧f(x
′
i, xNr{i}) 6 y∧z 6 v 6 y∨z 6 xi∨f(x
′
i, xNr{i}),
i.e. v ∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]. Assume without loss of generality that y 6= xi: it follows that v <
∗ y by
definition of <∗. If on the contrary {y, z} ∩ (X r [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]) 6= ∅ then clearly by definition
of <∗there exists w ∈ {y, z} such that v <∗ w. Thus, <∗∈ UX as claimed. Also, by assumption
f(xN ) ∈ X r [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] whence by construction f(x
′
i, xNr{i}) ≻
∗ f(xN ). But then, f is not
strategy-proof on UNX .
(i) ⇒ (iii) Again, let f be BX -monotonic with respect to X . Now, consider any < = (<j
)j∈N ∈ S
N
X and any i ∈ N . By definition of BX -monotonicity f(top(<i), xNr{i}) ∈ [top(<i
), f(xi, xNr{i})] for all xNr{i} ∈ X
Nr{i} and xi ∈ X . But then, either f(top(<i), xNr{i}) =
f(xi, xNr{i}) or f(top(<i), xNr{i}) ≻i f(xi, xNr{i}) by locally strict unimodality of <i. Hence,
f(top(<i), xNr{i}) <i f(xi, xNr{i}) in any case. It follows that f is indeed strategy-proof on S
N
X .
(iii) ⇒ (i) Let us assume that f : XN → X is not BX -monotonic: thus, there exist i ∈ N ,
x′i ∈ X and xN = (xi)i∈N ∈ X
N such that f(xN ) /∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]. Then, consider a binary
relation
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≻′on X defined by the following clauses (α) xi = top(≻
′) i.e. xi ≻
′ y for all y ∈ X r {xi};
(β) if {y, z} ⊆ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] r {xi} then y ≻
′ z if and only if z ∈ [xi, y] r {y}; (γ) if y ∈
[xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]r{xi} and z /∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] then y ≻
′ z ; (δ) if {y, z} ⊆ Xr[xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]
then y ≻′ z if and only if z ∈ [xi, y]r {y}.
Then, observe that ≻′ ∩
{
[xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]
}2
and ≻′ ∩
{
X r [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})]
}2
amount to the
restrictions of ≻xias defined above (see Claim 2) to [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] and X r [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})],
respectively, hence by Claim 2 are S-consistent and therefore admits non-trivial extensions to total
preorders <′1and <
′
2on their respective disjoint domains. It follows that <
′=<′1 ⊕ <
′
2 as defined by
the rule x <′ y if and only if (x <′1 y, x <
′
2 y or x ∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] and y ∈ Xr[xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})])
is a total preorder on X . Moreover,<′is locally strictly unimodal by construction i.e. <′∈ SNX . Also,
by assumption f(xN ) ∈ Xr [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})] whence by construction f(x
′
i, xNr{i}) ≻
′ f(xN ). But
then, f is not strategy-proof on SNX . 
Proof of Lemma 2. Take any xN ∈ X
N . By definition of BX -monotonicity, it suffices to show that
for any i ∈ N and x′i ∈ X , µ(f, g, h)(xN ) ∈ [xi, µ(f, g, h)(x
′
i, xNr{i})]. Indeed, by monotonicity
of f, g, h with respect to X , f(xN ) ∈ [xi, f(x
′
i, xNr{i})], g(xN ) ∈ [xi, g(x
′
i, xNr{i})], and h(xN ) ∈
[xi, h(x
′
i, xNr{i})].
A change of variables is in order here for the sake of convenience, namely xf = f(xN ), x
′
f =
f(x′i, xNr{i}), xg = g(xN ), x
′
g = g(x
′
i, xNr{i}), xh = h(xN ), x
′
h = h(x
′
i, xNr{i}), whence µ(f, g, h)(xN ) =
µ(xf , xg, xh), and µ(f, g, h)(x
′
i, xNr{i}) = µ(x
′
f , x
′
g, x
′
h). Thus, xi ∧ x
′
l 6 xl 6 xi ∨ x
′
l, l = f, g, h,
by hypothesis, while the thesis amounts to xi ∧ µ(x
′
f , x
′
g, x
′
h) 6 µ(xf , xg, xh) 6 xi ∨ µ(x
′
f , x
′
g, x
′
h).
Now, µ(x′f , x
′
g, x
′
h) = (x
′
f ∧ x
′
g)∨ (x
′
g ∧ x
′
h)∨ (x
′
f ∧ x
′
h) hence by distributivity and the basic latticial
identities we get:
xi ∧ ((x
′
f ∧ x
′
g) ∨ (x
′
g ∧ x
′
h) ∨ (x
′
f ∧ x
′
h))
= (xi ∧ (x
′
f ∧ x
′
g)) ∨ (xi ∧ (x
′
g ∧ x
′
h)) ∨ (xi ∧ (x
′
f ∧ x
′
h))
= ((xi ∧ x
′
f ) ∧ (xi ∧ x
′
g)) ∨ ((xi ∧ x
′
g) ∧ (xi ∧ x
′
h)) ∨ ((xi ∧ x
′
f ) ∧ (xi ∧ x
′
h)).
However, by hypothesis, distributivity and the basic latticial identities again:
((xi ∧ x
′
f ) ∧ (xi ∧ x
′
g)) ∨ ((xi ∧ x
′
g) ∧ (xi ∧ x
′
h)) ∨ ((xi ∧ x
′
f ) ∧ (xi ∧ x
′
h))
6 (xf ∧ xg) ∨ (xg ∧ xh) ∨ (xf ∧ xh) = µ(xf , xg, xh)
6 ((xi ∨ x
′
f ) ∧ (xi ∨ x
′
g)) ∨ ((xi ∨ x
′
g) ∧ (xi ∨ x
′
h)) ∨ ((xi ∨ x
′
f ) ∧ (xi ∨ x
′
h))
= (xi ∨ (x
′
f ∧ x
′
g)) ∨ (xi ∨ (x
′
g ∧ x
′
h)) ∨ (xi ∨ (x
′
f ∧ x
′
h))
= xi ∨ ((x
′
f ∧ x
′
g) ∨ (x
′
g ∧ x
′
h) ∨ (x
′
f ∧ x
′
h)) = xi ∨ µ(x
′
f , x
′
g, x
′
h)
as required. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Take any xNr{1} ∈ X
Nr{1} and consider fxNr{1} : X → X as defined by the
rule fxNr{1}(x1) = f(x1, xNr{1}) for all x1 ∈ X . Thus, by definition fxNr{1} is BX -monotonic with
respect to (X,6), i.e. fxNr{1}(x) ∈ [x, fxNr{1}(y)], namely
x ∧ fxNr{1}(y) 6 fxNr{1}(x) 6 x ∨ fxNr{1}(y) for any x, y ∈ X.
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In particular,
⊥ = ⊥ ∧ fxNr{1}(x1) 6 fxNr{1}(⊥) 6 ⊥ ∨ fxNr{1}(x1) = fxNr{1}(x1),
fxNr{1}(x1) = ⊤ ∧ fxNr{1}(x1) 6 fxNr{1}(⊤) 6 ⊤ ∨ fxNr{1}(x1) = ⊤,
x1 ∧ fxNr{1}(⊥) 6 fxNr{1}(x1) 6 x1 ∨ fxNr{1}(⊥), and
x1 ∧ fxNr{1}(⊤) 6 fxNr{1}(x1) 6 x1 ∨ fxNr{1}(⊤), for all x1 ∈ X .
Now, take any x1 ∈ X and consider µ(fxNr{1}(⊥), x1, fxNr{1}(⊤)). By definition, and distributivity
of (X,6),
µ(fxNr{1}(⊥), x1, fxNr{1}(⊤))
= (x1 ∧ fxNr{1}(⊥)) ∨ (x1 ∧ fxNr{1}(⊤)) ∨ (fxNr{1}(⊥) ∧ fxNr{1}(⊤))
= (x1 ∨ fxNr{1}(⊥)) ∧ (x1 ∨ fxNr{1}(⊤) ∧ (fxNr{1}(⊥) ∨ fxNr{1}(⊤)).
Since by BX -monotonicity, as observed above,
x1 ∧ fxNr{1}(⊥) 6 fxNr{1}(x1), x1 ∧ fxNr{1}(⊤) 6 fxNr{1}(x1), and
fxNr{1}(⊥) ∧ fxNr{1}(⊤) = fxNr{1}(⊥) 6 fxNr{1}(x1),
it follows that µ(fxNr{1}(⊥), x1, fxNr{1}(⊤)) 6 fxNr{1}(x1). Similarly,
fxNr{1}(x1) 6 x1 ∨ fxNr{1}(⊥), fxNr{1}(x1) 6 x1 ∨ fxNr{1}(⊤), and
fxNr{1}(x1) 6 fxNr{1}(⊤) = fxNr{1}(⊥) ∨ fxNr{i}(⊤).
It follows that fxNr{1}(x1) 6 µ(fxNr{1}(⊥), x1, fxNr{1}(⊤)) as well, whence
fxNr{1}(x1) = µ(fxNr{1}(⊥), x1, fxNr{1}(⊤)) = µ(fxNr{1}(⊥), pi1(x1), fxNr{1}(⊤))
= µ(f(⊥, xNr{1}), pi1(x1), f(⊤, xNr{1})), i.e.
fxNr{1} = µ(f(⊥, xNr{1}), pi1, f(⊤, xNr{1})).
Thus, for all x1 ∈ X , fxNr{1}(x1) is the first term of the nested sequence of medians that provides
the run of the median tree-automaton AI,λµ as initialized with ballot profile xN and applied to the
finite (Σµ, I)-tree T = T (xN ,{f(x
∗)}x∗∈{⊥,⊤}N ) with terminal nodes suitably labelled by projections
of xN and elements of {f(x
∗)}x∗∈{⊥,⊤}N .
Next, consider fxNr{1,2} : X
2 → X as defined by the following rule: for all x1, x2 ∈ X ,
fxNr{1,2}(x1, x2) = f(x1, x2, xNr{1,2}) = µ(f(⊥, xNr{1}), pi1(x1), f(⊤, xNr{1}))
= µ(f(⊥, x2, xNr{1,2}), pi1(x1), f(⊤, x2, xNr{1,2})).
By repeating the previous argument of this proof as applied to both f(⊥, x2, xNr{1,2}) and f(⊤, x2, xNr{1,2}),
it follows that:
fxNr{1,2}(x1, x2) = µ(µ(f(⊥,⊥, xNr{1,2}), pi2(x2), f(⊥,⊤, xNr{1,2})),
pi1(x1), µ(f(⊤,⊥, xNr{1,2}), pi2(x2), f(⊤,⊤, xNr{1,2}))),
i.e. fxNr{1,2} is the fourth term of the nested sequence of medians that provides the run of the
median tree-automatonAI,λµ as initialized with ballot profile xN and applied to the finite (Σ
µ, I)-tree
T = T (xN ,{f(x
∗)}x∗∈{⊥,⊤}N ) as mentioned above. Repeated iteration of the very same argument
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establishes that, for all xN ∈ X
N , f(xN ) = A
I,λ
µ (T ) i.e. f(xN ) is the value of the behaviour of A
I,λ
µ
at T . 
Proof of Theorem 1. (i)⇐⇒ (ii) It follows from Lemma 1.
(i)⇐⇒ (iii) It also follows from Lemma 1.
(i) =⇒ (iv) Immediate from Lemma 3.
(iv) =⇒ (i) It follows immediately from the definition of l-median TA-representation, from the
observation that projections and constants induce BX -monotonic voting rules, and from Lemma 2.
(iv) =⇒ (v) Suppose f has a Σµ-tree automata representation. Then, by construction, there
exists a set of at most 2|N | distinct elements namely
f [{⊥,⊤}
N
] =
{
f(zN ) : zN ∈ {⊥,⊤}
N
}
such that f(xN ) is the output of an l-median tree au-
tomaton with input set I(f(xN )) := f [{⊥,⊤}
N ]∪{xi : i ∈ N}. But then, by definition of the output
computation rule of an l-median tree automaton it is immediately checked that f(xN ) is the join of
a finite set of meets ∧kj=1zj , k ≤ 2
|N |, zi ∈ I(f(xN )), i = 1, ..., k. Hence, by positing
yS [∧
k
j=1zj ] = ∧ (z : z = zj for some j = 1, ..., k and zj 6= xi for all i ∈ N)
where S[∧kj=1zj] := {i ∈ N : xi = zh for some h = 1, ..., k}, and
y∗S = ∨(yS [∧
k
j=1zj ] such that S[∧
k
j=1zj] = S),
and noticing that yS thus defined does not depend on xN ,
it follows that there exists a nonempty C ⊆ P(N) such that
f(xN ) = ∨S∈C((∧i∈Sxi) ∧ y
∗
S).
Moreover, by putting y∗T = ⊥ for any T ∈ P(N)r C, it also follows that
f(xN ) = ∨S⊆N ((∧i∈Sxi) ∧ y
∗
S)
hence f is indeed a generalized weak committee voting rule.
(v) =⇒ (i) Let f : XN → X be a generalized weak committee voting rule i.e. there exists an
order filter F of (P(N),⊆) such that f(xN ) = ∨S∈F((∧i∈Sxi)∧y
∗
S) for all xN ∈ X
N . Then, observe
that -for any x, y ∈ X- x ∧ y = µ(x, y,⊥) and x ∨ y = µ(x, y,⊤). Hence by repeated application of
Lemma 2 it follows that f is BX -monotonic. 
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) Take restricted voting rule f ′ as introduced in Remark 1 above, where it
was also shown that f ′ is strategy-proof on D2 × U
Nr{1,2}
X and on (D
′)2 × S
Nr{1,2}
X .
Now, to address the strategy-proofness issue on D2 × U
Nr{1,2}
X consider any preference profile
(<i)i∈N such that <1=<
′ and <2=< hence top(<1) = d, top(<2) = a. Then, for any xNr{1,2} ∈
XNr{1,2}, both
f ′(a, d, xNr{1,2}) ≻ 1f
′(top(<1), top(<2), xNr{1,2}) and
f ′(a, d, xNr{1,2}) ≻ 2f
′(top(<1), top(<2), xNr{1,2}),
it follows that coalition {1, 2} can manipulate the outcome at (<i)i∈N namely f
′ is not coalitionally
strategy-proof on D2 × U
Nr{1,2}
X . Strategy-proofness (and failure of coalitional strategy-proofness)
of f ′ on (D′)2 × S
Nr{1,2}
X is proved in a similar way by replacing < and <
′ with <′′ and <′′′,
respectively.
(ii) Let us assume without loss of generality that |X | = 4 and let X = {a, b, c, d} and ∆X =
{(x, x) : x ∈ X}. Next, define 6∗∗= {(a, b), (a, c), (a, d), (b, d), (c, d)} ∪∆X .
It is easily checked that X ∗∗ = (X,6∗∗) is the Boolean lattice 22 with a = ⊤, d = ⊥.
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Now, define the family {f(x∗)}x∗∈{⊥,⊤}N as follows: for all xNr{1,2} ∈ {⊥,⊤}
Nr{1,2}
f(a, a, xNr{1,2}) = a, f(d, d, xNr{1,2}) = d, f(a, d, xNr{1,2}) = b, f(d, a, xNr{1,2}) = c.
Then, consider the nested sequence of medians that provides the run of the median tree-automaton
AI,λµ as initialized with ballot profile xN and applied to the finite (Σ
µ, I)-tree T = T (xN ,{f(x
∗)}x∗∈{⊥,⊤}N )
with terminal nodes suitably labelled by projections of xN and elements of {f(x
∗)}x∗∈{⊥,⊤}N as
defined above (notice that f is by construction an extension of f ′ to XN as mentioned above under
part (i) of the present proof). A few simple if tedious calculations immediately establish that for all
xNr{1,2} ∈ X
Nr{1,2}:
f(a, c, xNr{1,2}) = f(b, a, xNr{1,2}) = f(b, c, xNr{1,2}) = a,
f(b, b, xNr{1,2}) = f(a, b, xNr{1,2}) = f(b, d, xNr{1,2}) = b,
f(c, c, xNr{1,2}) = f(c, a, xNr{1,2}) = f(d, c, xNr{1,2}) = c,
f(c, d, xNr{1,2}) = f(d, c, xNr{1,2}) = f(c, b, xNr{1,2}) = d.
By construction, and in view of Lemma 3 above, f is BX ∗∗- monotonic. Therefore, by Lemma 1, f
is also strategy-proof on UNX ∗∗ .
Now, take
< = {(a, b), (a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d), (c, d), (d, c)} ∪∆X ,
<
′
= {(d, b), (d, c), (d, a), (b, c), (b, a), (c, a), (a, c)} ∪∆X ,
as defined in Remark 2 above.
First, observe that both < and <′are in UNX ∗∗, i.e. are unimodal with respect to X
∗∗: indeed,
top(<) = a, top(<′) = d and it is immediately seen that
BX (X, 6
∗∗) =
{
(a, b, d), (a, c, d), (b, a, c), (b, d, c), (d, b, a),
(d, c, a), (c, a, b), (c, d, b)
}
∪
∪
{
(x, y, z) ∈ X3 : x = y or z = y
}
.
But then, since {(b, d), (c, d), (a, b), (d, c)}∪∆X is a subrelation of < and {(b, a), (c, a), (a, c), (d, c)}∪
∆X is a subrelation of <
′, it follows that < and <′are also unimodal with respect to X ∗∗. Now,
take any preference profile (<i)i∈N such that <1=<
′ and <2=<, hence top(<1) = d, top(<2) =
a. Then, for any xNr{1,2} ∈ X
Nr{1,2}, both f(a, d, xNr{1,2}) ≻1 f(top(<1), top(<2), xNr{1,2})
and f(a, d, xNr{1,2}) ≻2 f(top(<1), top(<2), xNr{1,2}): it follows that, again, coalition {1, 2} can
manipulate the outcome at (<i)i∈N namely f is not coalitionally strategy-proof.
Again, strategy-proofness and failure of coalitional strategy-proofness of f on SNX ∗∗ follows from
the very same argument, by positing <1=<
′′ and <2=<
′′′. 
Proof of Corollary 1. (i) =⇒ (ii) It follows immediately from Theorem 2 (ii) above;
(ii) =⇒ (i) For the case concerning UNY , the statement follows from a straightforward exten-
sion and adaptation of the proof of Proposition 4 of Danilov (1994) concerning voting rules on
unimodal domains of linear orders in undirected bounded trees (details available from the authors
upon request), and is indeed already stated without explicit proof in Moulin (1980). As far as SNY
is concerned, the statement follows e.g. from Theorem 2 and Proposition 3 of Barbera`, Berga and
Moreno (2010). 
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND SINGLE PEAKEDNESS 31
Proof of Thorem 3. Let us assume that on the contrary there exists a voting rule f : XN → X which
is anonymous, locally JI-neutral on Y , locally sovereign on Y , and coalitionally strategy-proof on
UNX (on S
N
X , respectively). By Theorem 1, it follows that there exists an order filter F of (P(N),⊆)
such that
f(xN ) = ∨S∈F((∧i∈Sxi) ∧ y
∗
S) for all xN ∈ X
N .
To begin with, observe that coalitional strategy-proofness and local sovereignty on Y jointly
imply local idempotence on Y (indeed, suppose there exists u ∈ Y , u 6= f(uN ); of course, by local
sovereignty there exists xN ∈ X
N such that f(xN ) = u. But then f is coalitionally manipulable at
any preference profile (<i)i∈N ∈ U
N
X ((<i)i∈N ∈ S
N
X , respectively) such that top(<i) = u for all
i ∈ N , a contradiction).
Next, for any u ∈ Y denote by Su the set of all minimal coalitions T ∈ F such that u 6
f(uT , wNrT ) for all wNrT ∈ XNrT . By local idempotence of f on Y , Su 6= ∅. By anonymity of
f , |T | = |T ′| = nu for all T, T
′ ∈ Su, and y
∗
S = y
∗
S′ = y
∗
s for any S, S
′ ∈ F such that |S| = |S′| = s.
Moreover, since by Theorem 1 coalitional strategy-proofness entails in particular BX -monotonicity,
it also follows -by definition of BX -monotonicity- that for any i ∈ N r T
u = u ∧ f(uT , wNrT ) 6 f((uT∪{i}, wNr(T∪{i})) 6 u ∨ f(uT , wNrT )
whence, by repeated application of that argument
u 6 f(uT
′
, wNrT
′
) for any T ′ ⊆ N such that |T ′| ≥ nu.
Also, by local JI-neutrality on Y of f , nx = nz = q.
Four cases are to be distinguished according to the sign of (q − n/2) and the parity of n.
(α): Let us first suppose that q ≤ n/2.
Then, in order to address the unimodal case consider the following triple of preference relations:
<∗:= [x ≻∗ 0 ≻∗ x ∨ z ∼∗ z ∼∗ w for all w ∈ X r Y ],
<∗∗:= [z ≻∗∗ 0 ≻∗∗ x ∨ z ∼∗∗ x ∼∗∗ w for all w ∈ X r Y ],
<∗∗∗:= [0 ≻∗∗∗ x ∼∗∗∗ z ∼∗∗∗ x ∨ z ∼∗∗∗ w for all w ∈ X r Y ].
Notice that by construction such preferences are unimodal with respect to X , i.e. {<∗,<∗∗,<∗∗∗} ⊆
UNX .
Two subcases are distinguished according to the parity of n, namely
(i) n = 2k + 1 for some positive integer k, and (ii) n = 2k for some positive integer k.
If (α(i)) obtains then take preference profile
<[O] = ((<
∗
i )i∈{1,...,k}, (<
∗∗
i )i∈{k+1,...,2k},<
∗∗∗
2k+1)
and compute f(yN) = ∨S∈F ((∧i∈Syi) ∧ y
∗
s )
where yN = top(<[O]) i.e. yi = x for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}, yi = z for all i ∈ {k + 1, ..., 2n}, and
y2k+1 = 0.
By construction, f(yN ) is the l.u.b. of a nonempty family T of terms belonging to some of the
following jointly exhaustive, partially overlapping classes:
T1 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set J and there exists j ∈ J such that vj = 0} ,
T2 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set J and there exist j, h ∈ J such that vj = x and vh = z} ,
T3 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists J
′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| ≥ q and vj = x for all j ∈ J
′} ,
T4 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists J
′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| ≥ q and vj = z for all j ∈ J
′}.
Moreover, t = ∧j∈Jvj = 0 for all t ∈ T1 ∪ T2 hence, by construction, T3 ∩ T 6= ∅ 6= T4 ∩ T . On
the other hand, t3 > x and t4 > z for any t3 ∈ T3 and t4 ∈ T4.
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It follows that f(yN) > x ∨ z.
If (α(ii)) obtains then take preference profile
<[E] = ((<
∗
i )i∈{1,...,k}, (<
∗∗
i )i∈{k+1,...,2k}),
and compute f(y′N) = ∨S∈F ((∧i∈Sy
′
i) ∧ y
∗
s ),
where y′N = top(<[E]) i.e. y
′
i = x for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}, and y
′
i = z for all i ∈ {k + 1, ..., 2n},
Again, f(y′N) is the l.u.b. of a nonempty family T of terms belonging to some of the following
jointly exhaustive, partially overlapping classes:
T ′1 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set J and there exist j, h ∈ J such that vj = x and vh = z} ,
T ′2 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists J
′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| ≥ q and vj = x for all j ∈ J
′} ,
T ′3 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists J
′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| ≥ q and vj = z for all j ∈ J
′}.
Moreover, t = ∧j∈Jvj = 0 for all t ∈ T
′
1 hence, by construction, T
′
2 ∩ T 6= ∅ 6= T
′
3 ∩ T . On the
other hand, t2 > x and t3 > z for any t2 ∈ T
′
2 and t3 ∈ T
′
3.
It follows, again, that f(y′N ) > x ∨ z.
Now, take uN ∈ X
N with ui = 0 for all i ∈ N : by local idempotence, f(uN ) = 0.
Thus, if n = 2k+1, f((ui = 0)i∈Nr{2k+1}, y2k+1 = 0) = f(uN) ≻i f(yN) for all i ∈ Nr{2k + 1}.
Similarly, if n = 2k, then f(uN) ≻i f(yN) for all i ∈ N . Hence, f is coalitionally manipulable at
unimodal preference profile <[O] (at unimodal preference profile <[E], respectively), a contradiction.
The locally strictly unimodal case can be addressed precisely by the same argument, provided
preference profile (<∗,<∗∗,<∗∗∗) is replaced by any locally strictly unimodal preference profile
(<′,<′′,<′′′) such that
<′:= [x ≻′ 0 ≻′ x ∨ z ≻′ z ≻ w for all w ∈ X r Y ],
<′′:= [z ≻′′ 0 ≻′′ x ∨ z ≻′′ x ≻′′ w for all w ∈ X r Y ],
<′′′:= [0 ≻′′′ x ≻′′′ z ≻′′′ x ∨ z ≻′′′ w for all w ∈ X r Y ].
(β) Let us now assume that, on the contrary, q > (n/2).
Then, consider the following triple of preference relations:
<◦:= [x ≻◦ x ∨ z ≻◦ 0 ∼◦ z ∼◦ w for all w ∈ X r Y ],
<◦◦:= [z ≻◦◦ x ∨ z ≻◦◦ 0 ∼◦◦ x ∼◦◦ w for all w ∈ X r Y ],
<◦◦◦:= [0 ≻◦◦◦ x ∼◦◦◦ z ∼◦◦◦ x ∨ z ∼◦◦◦ w for all w ∈ X r Y ].
Notice that by construction such preferences are unimodal with respect to X , i.e. {<◦,<◦◦,<′} ⊆
UX .
Two subcases are distinguished again according to the parity of n, namely
(i) n = 2k + 1 for some positive integer k, and (ii) n = 2k for some positive integer k.
If (β(i)) obtains, then take preference profile
<◦[O] = ((<
◦
i )i∈{1,...,k}, (<
◦◦
i )i∈{k+1,...,2k},<
◦◦◦
n )
and compute f(wN ) = ∨S∈F ((∧i∈Swi) ∧ y
∗
s )
where wN = top(<
◦
[O]) i.e. wi = x for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}, wi = z for all i ∈ {k + 1, ..., 2k}, and
wn = 0.
By construction, f(wN ) is the l.u.b. of a nonempty family T of terms belonging to some of the
following jointly exhaustive, partially overlapping classes:
T1 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set J and there exists j ∈ J such that v j = 0} ,
T2 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set J and there exist j, h ∈ J such that vj = x and vh = z} ,
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T3 =
{
∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists
a nonempty J ′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| ≤ k < q and vj = x for all j ∈ J
′
}
,
T4 =
{
∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists
a nonempty J ′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| ≤ k < q and vj = z for all j ∈ J
′
}
.
Notice that, again, t = ∧j∈Jvj = 0 for all t ∈ T1∪T2 . Moreover, by construction, t = ∧j∈Jvj < x
for all t ∈ T3 and t = ∧j∈Jvj < z for all t ∈ T4. Since both x and y are atoms of X , it follows that
t = ∧j∈Jvj = 0 for all t ∈ T3∪ T4 whence f(wN ) = 0.
If (β(ii)) obtains then take preference profile
<◦[E] = ((<
◦
i )i∈{1,...,k}, (<
◦◦
i )i∈{k+1,...,2k−1},<
◦◦◦
n ),
and compute f(w′N ) = ∨S∈F ((∧i∈Sw
′
i) ∧ y
∗
s ),
where w′N = top(<
′
[E]) i.e. w
′
i = x for all i ∈ {1, ..., k}, w
′
i = z for all i ∈ {k + 1, ..., 2k − 1}, and
w′n = 0.
Again, f(w′N ) is the l.u.b. of a nonempty family T of terms belonging to some of the following
jointly exhaustive, partially overlapping classes:
T ′1 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set J and there exists j ∈ J such that v j = 0} ,
T ′2 =
{
∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set J and there exist
j, h ∈ J such that vj = x and vh = z
}
,
T ′3 =
{
∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists
a nonempty J ′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| < q and vj = x for all j ∈ J
′
}
,
T ′4 =
{
∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists
a nonempty J ′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| < q and vj = z for all j ∈ J
′
}
.
Notice that t = ∧j∈Jvj = 0 for all t ∈ T
′
1, and for all t ∈ T
′
2 as well since x ∧ z = 0. Moreover,
since f(w′N ) = ∨S∈F ((∧i∈Sw
′
i) ∧ y
∗
s ), it also follows that t = ∧j∈Jvj < x for all t ∈ T
′
3 ∩ T and
t = ∧j∈Jvj < z for all t ∈ T
′
4 ∩ T . On the other hand, t2 > x and t3 > z for any t2 ∈ T
′
2 and
t3 ∈ T
′
3.
It follows, again, that f(w′N ) = 0.
Now, take u′N ∈ X
N with u′i = x ∨ z for all i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} = N r {n}, and u
′
n = 0. By
construction,
f(u′N) = ∨S∈F((∧i∈Su
′
i) ∧ y
∗
s )
is the l.u.b. of a nonempty family T of terms belonging to some of the following jointly exhaustive,
partially overlapping classes:
T ′′1 = {∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set J and there exists j ∈ J such that v j = 0} ,
T ′′2 =
{
∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists
a nonempty J ′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| < q and vj = x ∨ z for all j ∈ J
′
}
,
T ′′3 =
{
∧j∈Jvj : J is a finite set and there exists
J ′ ⊆ J such that |J ′| ≥ q and vj = x ∨ z for all j ∈ J
′
}
.
Observe that t = ∧j∈Jvj = 0 for all t ∈ T
′′
1 . Moreover, by definition of f and q, both y
∗
s′ < x
and y∗s′ < z for all s
′ < q, hence t = ∧j∈Jvj = 0 for all t ∈ T
′′
2 as well. Furthermore, T
′′
3 ∩ T 6= ∅
and , by definition of f and q, it must be the case that for all s ≥ q, both x 6 y∗s and z 6 y
∗
s hold.
Therefore, x ∨ z 6 y∗s . It follows that f(u
′
N ) = x ∨ z.
Thus, if n = 2k + 1, f(u′N) ≻i f(wN ) for all i ∈ N r {n}.
Similarly, if n = 2k, then f(u′N) ≻i f(w
′
N ) for all i ∈ N r {n}.
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Hence, f is coalitionally manipulable at unimodal preference profile <◦[O] ∈ U
N
X (at unimodal
preference profile <◦[E] ∈ U
N
X , respectively), a contradiction again, and the proof is complete.
The locally strictly unimodal case can be addressed precisely by the same argument, provided
preference profile (<∗,<∗∗,<∗∗∗) is replaced by any locally strictly unimodal preference profile
(<+,<++,<+++) such that
<+:= [x ≻+ x ∨ z ≻+ 0 ≻+ z ≻+ w for all w ∈ X r Y ],
<++:= [z ≻++ x ∨ z ≻++ 0 ≻++ x ≻++ w for all w ∈ X r Y ],
<+++:= [0 ≻+++ x ≻+++ z ≻+++ x ∨ z ≻+++ w for all w ∈ X r Y ]. 
7. Appendix 2: Tree automata
Tree automata are a powerful generalization of the more widely known sequential automata (see
chpt. 2 of Ada´mek and Trnkova´ (1990) for a thorough treatment of tree automata in a categorial
framework).
A finitary type is a pair Σ = (S, α) where S is a set (whose members denote operation symbols)
and α ∈ NS is a function mapping S into natural numbers which specifies for each s ∈ S the
corresponding (finitary) ‘arity’ α(s) ∈ N of the corresponding operation.26 A Σ-algebra is a pair
A = (X, {fs}s∈S) where X is a set and, for each s ∈ Σ, fs : X
α(s) → X is an α(s)-ary operation
on X . For any pair of Σ-algebras A = (X, {fs}s∈S), B = (X
′, {f ′s}s∈S) a homomorphism of A into
B is an operation-preserving function ϕ : X → X ′, namely for each s ∈ S and x1, ..., xα(s) ∈ X ,
f ′s(ϕ(x1), ..., ϕ(xα(s))) = ϕ(fs(x1, ..., xs)).
A non-initial Σ-tree automaton is a quadruple A =(Q, {ds}s∈S , Y, h) where Q is a set, the set of
states, ds : Q
α(s) → Q is α(s)-ary operation on Q for any s ∈ S , Y is a set, the output alphabet, and
h : Q −→ Y is the output function: thus, A amounts to a Σ-algebra (Q, {ds}s∈S) supplemented with
an output alphabet and an output function modeling the ‘external’ effects or observable behaviour
of the former.
A (initial) Σ-tree automaton is a sixtuple AI,λ = (Q, {ds}s∈S , Y, h, I, λ) where
A = (Q, {ds}s∈S , Y, h) is a non-initial Σ-tree automaton, I is a set, the set of variables, and
λ : I → Q is the initialization function.
For any set I of variables, a finite labelled (Σ, I)-tree is a triple T = (P,6, p0) such that: (i)
P ⊆ Σ ∪ I is the finite set of nodes, (ii) ≤ is a partial order on P with the tree property namely
for any p ∈ P the set p ↓= {q ∈ P : q ≤ p} of ≤-predecessors of p is linearly ordered i.e. is a chain,
(iii) p0 ∈ P is the root of T i.e. the minimum of (P,≤), (iv) for any p ∈ P if p ∈ I or p = s for
some s ∈ S such that α(s) = 0 then p is ≤-maximal (or a terminal node of T ); (v) for any p ∈ P if
p = s ∈ Σ then p is the lower cover (or immediate ≤-predecessor) of precisely α(s) nodes.
Observe that any p ∈ P induces a finite labelled (Σ, I)-tree (p ↑,6|p↑, p), the sub-(Σ, I)-tree of
T with root p (where p ↑= {q ∈ P : p ≤ q}). In particular, each terminal node p may be identified
with a degenerate one-node finite labelled (Σ, I)-tree Tp = ({p} ,=, p).
The AI,λ-initialized version of a finite labelled (Σ, I)-tree T , denoted by T (AI,λ), is obtained
from T by substituting state λ(p) ∈ Q for each variable p ∈ P ∩ I.
26The degree m = m(Σ) of finitary type Σ is the largest ‘arity’ of an operation denoted by one of its symbols i.e.
m(Σ) = ∨s∈Sα(s) (if such ‘arities’ are unbounded posit m(Σ) = ω where ω = |N|). As usual, m is identified here
with the set of all natural numbers smaller than m, starting with 0.
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The set of all finite labelled (Σ, I)-trees is denoted TI and can be naturally endowed with the
structure of a Σ-algebra by positing for any s ∈ S, ψs : T
α(s)
I −→ TI defined as follows: for each
T1, ..., Tα(s) ∈ TI ,
ψs(T1, ..., Tα(s)) is the finite labelled (Σ, I)-tree having s as its root, immediately followed by trees
T1, ..., Tα(s) themselves. Observe that each z ∈ I can be identified with a trivial one-node tree tz in
TI .
Moreover, it can be easily checked that (TI , {ψs}s∈S) is in fact the free Σ-algebra generated by
I, namely for each Σ-algebra (Q, {ds}s∈S) and for each function λ : I → Q there exists a unique
homomorphism ρ : TI → Q of (TI , {ψs}s∈S) into (Q, {ds}s∈S) extending λ to the entire set TI of
finite labelled (Σ, I)-trees.
A Σ-tree automaton AI,λ = (Q, {ds}s∈S , Y, h, I, λ) acts on a finite labelled (Σ, I)-tree T by
initializing it through λ, computing the value at T (AI,λ) of the run map of AI,λ i.e. the unique
homomorphism ρ : TI → Q of (TI , {ψs}s∈S) into (Q, {ds}s∈S) extending λ, and taking h(ρ( T (A
I,λ))
as the output of Σ-tree automaton AI,λ when applied to finite labelled (Σ, I)-tree T . Hence, the
action of AI,λ on TI is summarized by the behaviour map of A
I,λ, namely AI,λ = h ◦ ρ : TI → Y .
That computation, namely AI,λ(T ) can also be described as a finite nested sequence (T (i) =
(P (i),≤(i), p
(i)
0 )i=0,...k) of finite labelled Σ-trees denoting the steps of a backward induction algo-
rithm, namely
(i) T (0) = T , T (1) = T (AI,λ), T (k) = Tq = ({q} ,=, q) for some q ∈ Q, and
(ii) for any i = 1, ..., k− 1, P (i+1) ⊆ P (i), ≤(i+1)=≤(i) ∩(P (i+1)×P (i+1)), and T (i+1) is obtained
from T (i) by replacing a non-terminal node labelled by some operation symbol s ∈ S (having only
terminal nodes labelled q1, ..., qα(s) as immediate ≤-successors) with a new terminal node labelled
with state δs(q1, ..., qα(s)).
Notice, however, that since those trees amount to sub-(Σ, I)-trees of T and can therefore be
identified with their roots, it follows that AI,λ(T ) = h(dp0(...(ds(q1, ..., qα(s))...)) where s = p
is the immediate 6-predecessor of some terminal node, q1 = λ(z1), ..., qα(s) = λ(zα(s)) for some
z1, ..., zα(s) ∈ I, namely A
I,λ(T ) -the behaviour of AI,λ at T - can also be equivalently written as
the output -value of the outcome of a nested sequence of Σ-operations dictated by T and applied to
λ(I) that detail the computation steps of the run map of AI,λ at T .
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